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Abstract  
How do political practices influence mass culture? Conversely, how does mass culture 
influence political practice? This project addresses these questions by turning to the concepts of 
utopia and dystopia. Imagined utopic and dystopic visions express both the hopes and anxieties 
of the societies producing them. Dystopias also highlight the mechanisms of power that function 
within particular social orders. Through readings of Lois Lowry’s The Giver and Phillip K. 
Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, I demonstrate how utopia and dystopia function 
and how we can respond to dystopic realities by theorizing solutions that are more conducive to 
the preservation of democracy. Additionally, I read Christopher Nolan’s Dark Knight Trilogy as 
a dystopia that exaggerates the fears of terrorism and crime in order to cause the viewers to see 
the ceding of civil liberties as a reasonable avenue for pursuing safety. In this way, the films 
reflect and support post-9/11 domestic and foreign policy, especially with respect to issues of 
surveillance. If this is the case, and if we are currently allowing our view of policy to be shaped 
by the imaginary mechanism that is dystopia, then is there another way that we can conceive of 
or imagine the world that is more conducive to democratic practices? The question of what a 
more-democratic response to dystopic imaginaries might be is tied to our real-world policy 
attempts to create utopic regimes in the here and now. 
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On the other hand, I do not think that there is anything that is functionally — by 
its very nature — absolutely liberating. Liberty is a practice. So there may, in 
fact, always be a certain number of projects whose aim is to modify some 
constraints, to loosen, or even to break them, but none of these projects can, 
simply by its nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, that it 
will be established by the project itself. The liberty of men is never assured by 
the institutions and laws intended to guarantee them. This is why almost all of 
these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around — not 
because they are ambiguous, but simply because “liberty” is what must be 
exercised. 
 —Michel Foucault 
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INTRODUCTION 
There exists in some branches of political science (though far less in the field of English) 
the reification of an artificial division between the “political” and everything else. Issues of 
statecraft, matters of public policy, and issues of law enforcement are all political. Film, literary 
text, and stage are not. In the realm of the political, neat and tidy classifications of human 
activity can be made so as to attempt to develop predictive theories of human behavior that will 
allow us better to craft law and policy. Politics is an issue of mass behavior that lends itself to 
mass incentivization. It may also be an enterprise in which structures can stand in for cultural 
practices in order to understand how particular nations might act toward each other (e.g. 
democratic peace theory). This division is considered to be fundamental, and it drives discourse 
to seek better theories of human behavior and activity while ignoring the remainders left over 
from the necessary oversimplification required by systematic attempts to capture the diversity of 
lived experience. 
In this work I reject this distinction as fundamentally incapable of apprehending the 
nature of human existence. Put simply, it’s all so much more complex than that. As Bent 
Flyvbjerg explains in his book Making Social Science Matter, the social sciences consistently fail 
to function adequately in a predictive fashion because they (often) abstract from the conditions 
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that actually influence human action and interaction, namely reflexivity and intersubjectivity.1 I 
instead focus on the ways that those media often thought of by the scientists of politics to be non-
political, the works of cultural representation and production that demonstrate and influence how 
we view each other and the world around us, are crucial to the study of politics. In my view, 
statecraft and the crafts of cultural production come from the same source, ex uno fonte. The 
ways in which humans see and interpret the world are not only demonstrated when human 
interaction occurs but also when human interaction is portrayed. The representations are just as 
important, if not more so, than the “actual” politics. 
It is with this perspective that I have here delved into the study of the place of utopia and 
dystopia in political thought. Of these, it was the dystopic that quickly caught my eye and my 
imagination. Unlike the utopian, the dystopian makes no claims to be universal or complete.2 
Instead, it presents only one possibly terrible situation — a, not the, potential future or place that 
is worse than the one that we currently inhabit but which, if it is to have any relevance to us at 
all, mirrors our world in certain crucial ways. Dystopia consequently avoids some of the pitfalls 
to which I believe utopia falls prey. Further, unlike the utopian, the dystopian does not 
necessarily need to be imagined in purely spatial terms. That is, while the utopian entails an 
organization of material reality in accordance with some sort of logistical vision, the dystopian 
may or may not embrace a particular societal structure. It may instead illuminate a feature of a 
world the structure of which is not fully known. Thus, in Chapter One I analyze both The Giver, 
which is more concerned with the organization of a society as a whole, and Do Androids Dream 
                                                                 
     
1
 Bent Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again , trans. 
Steven Sampson, 1 edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See especially pages 9-37. 
     
2
 Arguably, not all utopias do this either. However, the underlying assumption of a utopian society is that it is the 
best possible ordering for a particular area. In this sense, while utopian visions might be restricted to the local, they 
are still objective and totalizing in a way that ought to raise some degree of concern. 
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of Electric Sheep?, which focuses less on how society is structured and more on particular 
aspects of the social life of the society. It is the dystopian’s malleability that draws me to it. 
In the first chapter, “Dys(u)topia: A Study in Perspectivism and Power,” I begin by 
looking at the utopian and the dystopian in general terms. I propose that we ought not to view 
dystopian imaginaries as offering normative perspectives on the world but instead should see 
them as dramatized analytic tools that serve to expose hidden relations of power that already 
exist in our day-to-day lives. To this end, I analyze the two texts mentioned above and show how 
they highlight fears from the present and displace them into writing. The Giver is primarily 
concerned with the ways that the regulation of language produces subjects who are docile and 
disconnected from each other, while Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? concerns itself with 
the ways that we determine certain lives to be valuable and others to be disposable. In both, the 
dystopic brings to the fore mechanisms of power that function in our lives but to which we are 
often blind. 
The second chapter, “The Dark Knight and Democracy: Batman and the Dangers of 
Seized Authority,” picks up on the this theme by emphasizing that it is not merely the exposure 
of power relations that is important but also how we imagine our responses to these relations of 
power. The chapter does this through a close reading of Christopher Nolan’s Dark Knight 
Trilogy. Gotham is taken to be a dystopic situation, one in which crime is rampant and threats of 
mass terrorism the likes of which the world has never actually seen confront the citizenry almost 
daily. The superhero figure, Batman, is presented as the best viable response to the extreme 
dangers engineered by Ra’s al Ghul, the Joker, and Bane. Only an extralegal sovereign can 
preserve legal order. 
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The third and final chapter, “From Prison to PRISM: Panopticism and the NSA,” 
explores why the way we theorize Batman (and other responses to the dystopic) is important  
through a discussion of real-world post-9/11 policies, particularly those focused on surveillance, 
that seem to track closely with the tools that Batman employs. These laws show us why fictional 
dystopia is important: the ways that we approach issues of security are as determined by our 
portrayals of emergency issues as they are by the real emergencies themselves. The line between 
the “real” and the “imaginary” is blurry at best because the way that we understand the “real” 
always incorporates at least some “imaginary elements” in the sense that conceiving of policy or 
of approaches to existing problems requires thinking that is creative. 
This, then, is the fundamental aim of this project: to explore the role of the dystopian as 
an exposer of real-world relations of power. Without further ado… 
 
  
  
ONE 
 
• • • 
 
DYS(U)TOPIA: A STUDY IN PERSPECTIVISM AND 
POWER 
When the first film in The Hunger Games series was released, it had an opening weekend 
gross of $152 million.1 The second movie in the series, Catching Fire, surpassed it by about $6 
million, and the two films currently sit ninth and tenth on the list of all-time best opening 
weekends.2 All in all, the four movies in the series have collectively grossed just under $1.5 
billion.3 This has been followed more recently by the less-successful (with a gross of only $318 
million4) Divergent series, which has released three of a planned four movies. The second movie, 
Insurgent, was described by Rotten Tomatoes as part of a franchise “struggling to distinguish 
itself from the dystopian YA crowd.”5 While this may have been in part due to the quality of the 
film, the review identified an important feature of the genre: it is “crowded.” In recent memory 
alone, V for Vendetta, Watchmen, Snowpiercer, Mad Max: Fury Road, Total Recall, The Host, 
The Matrix (and its sequels), Rise of the Planet of the Apes, and Dawn of the Planet of the Apes 
                                                                 
     
1
 “Biggest Opening Weekends at the Box Office,” accessed March 26, 2016, 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/weekends/?pagenum=m50&sort=opengross&order=DESC&p=.htm. 
     
2
 Ibid. 
     
3
 “The Hunger Games Movies at the Box Office - Box Office Mojo,” accessed March 26, 2016, 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/franchises/chart/?id=hungergames.htm. 
     
4
 “Divergent Movies at the Box Office - Box Office Mojo,” accessed March 26, 2016, 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/franchises/chart/?id=divergent.htm. 
     
5
 “Insurgent,” Rotten Tomatoes, accessed October 24, 2015, http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/insurgent/ . 
Emphasis added. 
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are all examples of dystopic movies.6 Meanwhile, there has been an explosion of dystopian 
books during the 21st century. While it is difficult to find a comprehensive list of such works (if 
such a list could even exist), Wikipedia provides one of the largest. It categorizes 280 books as 
dystopic. Of these works, 164 were published prior to 2000 (the earliest in 1595), whereas 116 
have been published since.7 This means that about 71% of the number of dystopic books 
published during the 405 year span from 1595-2000 have been published in the last 16 years. If 
one were to include all the books and films that were not strictly dystopic but had dystopic 
elements, this list could most certainly be expanded. The genre is not just crowded; it is 
overflowing. 
What so deeply fascinates us with the dystopian? What about it captures the popular 
consciousness? Most importantly to this work, what political or theoretical function does the 
dystopic serve? The cultural productions that we consume play a critical role in constituting us, 
so it is significant that dystopian works comprise a large portion of what is being consumed. This 
chapter begins to explore the importance of dystopia by addressing it in opposition to and in 
mutual constitution with its sometimes opposite/sometimes doppelgänger utopia. I will first 
examine general theories of utopia and dystopia to obtain a sense of the functions of the genres. 
After this I will contend that the best way to view the dystopic is not as a normative argument 
but as an analytic account. I then provide the books The Giver and Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep? (Android) as examples of what thinking about dystopia in analytic terms can do 
for the analysis of works in the genre. 
                                                                 
     
6
 “Top Dystopian Movies and Books,” accessed March 17, 2016, http://dystopia.com/. This list provided 
assistance in recalling some examples of the dystopic. 
     
7
 “List of Dystopian Literature,” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia , March 15, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_dystopian_literature&oldid=710225488, accessed March 17, 
2016. Certainly, some of this increase is attributable to the likely increase in publishing totals in recent history, but 
information on the total number of books published each year is difficult to come by. However, it does not seem 
unreasonable to assume that since essentially anyone can publish their works in some format if they so choose, there 
has likely been a significant increase in book publications in recent times. 
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THEORIES OF DYS(U)TOPIA 
To begin I’d like to consider some general theories of dystopia. Gregory Claeys describes 
dystopia as “an inverted, mirrored or negative version of utopia, the imaginary bad place as 
opposed to the imaginary good place.”8 He offers “new definitions of the terms ‘utopia’ and 
‘dystopia’” that reformulate them in a way that demonstrates that “neither term indicates a purely 
literary tradition.”9 Similarly, Michael D. Gordin, Helen Tilley, and Gyan Prakash discuss 
utopias and dystopias as “histories of the present,” wherein dystopia is a “utopia that has gone 
wrong, or a utopia that functions only for a particular segment of society.”10 Their work treats 
utopia and dystopia “not as objects of study, but as historically grounded analytic categories 
with which to understand how individuals and groups around the world have interpreted their 
present tense with an eye to the future.”11 They want to look at how certain groups have viewed 
the conditions in which they find themselves and how utopia and dystopia as “intimately related 
acts of imagination” allow individuals to “reimagine their present and transform it into a 
plausible future.”12  
Gordin et al. further explain that though utopic imaginaries at the academic level have 
“died down” because the “present appeared (and to many still appears) to be a time that call[s] 
utopia into question,” there is still “large-scale planning of utopian or dystopian futures” by 
groups such as Al Qaeda and the World Trade Organization.13 In other words, though the critical 
theory project of determining a complete vision for the world and seeking to enact that vision is 
                                                                 
     
8
 Gregory Claeys, “News from Somewhere: Enhanced Sociability and the Composite De finition of Utopia and 
Dystopia,” History 98, no. 330 (April 2013): 155. Humanities International Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed 
October 25, 2015). 
     
9
 Ibid., 171. 
     
10
 Michael D. Gordin, Helen Tilley, and Gyan Prakash, eds., Utopia/Dystopia: Conditions of Historical 
Possibility (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010), 1. 
     
11
 Ibid., 3. 
     
12
 Ibid., 2-3. 
     
13
 Ibid., 3.     
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no longer considered favorably by the academic world — largely because history has not been 
kind to plans aimed at altering or improving the human condition — there are still groups driven 
by visions, whether hegemonic or not, of what society ought to look like.14 As such, we must 
examine visions for the future that are held by particular groups and question whether they work 
for all or only for some, and if only for some, then for whom and in what ways. Thus, for Gordin 
et al., the task is to understand utopian thought in order to understand utopian (and, similarly, 
dystopian) practices in the real world. They write, “What we focus on, therefore, is utopia as a 
practice, as a technique used by historical actors for understanding their particular contemporary 
circumstances — and thus a valuable lens for the historian.”15  
Claeys echoes the need to look for non-literary instances of both utopian and dystopian 
imaginaries when he cites totalitarianism as dystopia’s “dominant form in the twentieth 
century.”16 One of the most prominent examples of totalitarian dys(u)topia in the 20th century 
was Nazi Germany. Nazism fits within the definition of dystopia given by Gordin et al., though it 
is not mentioned specifically by them, in that it is a “utopia” that only functions for some. The 
Nazi regime sought to create a world wherein the Aryan race was privileged above other races. 
They pursued a “utopia” that was possible only at the expense of non-Aryan persons. Totalitarian 
regimes function to privilege some over others and as such are a form of dys(u)topia — a 
condition wherein the perspectival nature of utopic imaginaries becomes readily apparent 
through the dystopic elements that persist for some segment of a population.17 
                                                                 
     
14
 Compare, for example, the Marxist theory of class revolution, which seems to be a global class revolution, with 
Frederic Jameson’s image of the planned city as a type of utopia. In both instances, “What is utopian is then 
identified with this now-traditional and much criticized bourgeois idea of progress.” Frederic Jameson, “Utopia as 
Method, or the Uses of the Future,” Utopia/Dystopia: Conditions of Historical Possibility, Michael D. Gordin, 
Helen Tilley, and Gyan Prakash, eds.(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010), 21-22. 
     
15
 Ibid., 4. 
     
16
 Claeys, “News from Somewhere,” 162. 
     
17
 Gordin et al. do mention Hitler as one of several “midwife[s]” of historical dystopias along with Pol Pot, Mao, 
Nixon, Stalin, and Pinochet. Gordin et al., Utopia/Dystopia, 3. Claeys mentions totalitarian regimes without direct 
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In some sense, though, all social systems are dys(u)topias. William Connolly’s The Ethos 
of Pluralization illuminates the tendency to treat particular identities as normal and others as 
deviant.18 Connolly argues for a reformulation of modern (in both the sense of “modernist” and 
“current”) understandings of identity pluralism, what he calls a “pluralization” of pluralist 
systems. His “central question” is to ask how to “reconfigure and renegotiate the constitutive 
tension between democratic pluralism and pluralization,” that is, to understand how pluralism 
both limits and advances claims to new identities.19 Pluralist societies allow multiple forms of 
identities (religious identities, racial identities, etc.) but only within a delimited range of 
acceptability (e.g. religious pluralism may be acceptable whereas diversity in sexual or gender 
identity may not be). He writes that the “biggest impetus to fragmentation, violence, and 
anarchy” are those “totalistic identities engaged in implacable struggles against those differences 
that threaten their hegemony or exclusivity.”20 The construction of some identities as normative 
is effectively the production of a hegemony of identity, which is itself an exercise of disciplinary 
power that at least dimly reflects the techniques of totalitarian governments. A society that 
privileges some identities over others may be distinguishable from fascist regimes, but every 
social order — any instance where plurality can be found — has oft-realized dys(u)topic 
potential.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
reference to Hitler or Nazism, stating, “Thirdly, and consequently, a definition of ‘dystopia’ which also gives 
priority to content over form can be understood as portraying a society based upon fear – the opposite of friendship. 
Utopia and dystopia alike, from this perspective, are discourses principally (not exclusively) on the promise and 
threat, in turn, of intensified sociability. This invites consideration of political despotisms as a characteristic 
institutional form of dystopia, and totalitarianism, in the later modern period, as the most invidious form thereof. 
Here we will have to confront the charge that the dominant form of modern dystopianism inevitably emerged from 
utopianism, and particularly the secularization of Christian millenarianism.” Claeys, “News from Somehwere,” 146. 
Nazism will also be (analytically) central to the argument I later advance by way of Foucault. 
     
18
 I will note that these are not quite the terms in which he puts the argument. While Connolly draws a good deal 
from Foucault, the language of normality and abnormality is not the one that he primarily adopts. He instead prefers 
to talk of identity\difference, normalization, and the ontopolitical (not to claim that this list is exhaustive). 
     
19
 William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1995), xiv. 
     
20
 Ibid., xxi.  
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UTOPIA’S SALVATION? JAMESON’S “UTOPIA AS METHOD” 
But if every society and every construction of future-oriented potential always bears the 
mark of Cain (that is, a negative distinguishing feature setting it apart), then is there any hope for 
utopian futures? Can there be utopia that is not dys(u)topic? Fredric Jameson’s articulation of 
utopia as a “method” rather than as a “place” moves in the direction of offering an alternative.21 
He states that the idea of utopia is “not a representation but an operation calculated to disclose 
the limits of our own imagination of the future, the lines beyond which we do not seem able to 
go in imagining changes in our own society and world …”22 The utopian worlds we imagine 
show the extent to which we plausibly believe that our present conditions can be altered.  
Jameson distinguishes between the “utopian program” and the “utopian impulse,” 
rejecting the program as overly closed off. With regard to the impulse, he writes, “The utopian 
impulse, therefore, calls for a hermeneutic, for the detective work of a decipherment and a 
reading of utopian clues and traces in the landscape of the real; a theorization and interpretation 
of unconscious utopian investments in realities large or small, which may be far from utopian.”23 
This hermeneutic element entails a reimagining or receptivity to new ways of understanding 
potentially dystopic conditions as they emerge. Jameson says he wants to offer neither a 
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 Jameson, “Utopia as Method,” 21. Foucault takes a similar stance in the interview “Space, Knowledge, 
Power,” when responding to a question about utopian schemes. He states, “Men have dreamed of liberating 
machines. But there are not machines of freedom, by definition. This is not to say that the exercise of freedom is 
completely indifferent to spatial distribution, but it can only function when there is a certain convergence; in the case 
of divergence or distortion, it immediately becomes the opposite of that which had been intended.” Michel Foucault, 
“Space, Knowledge, and Power,” in Power, ed. Paul Rabinow, vol. 3, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 (New 
York: The New Press, 2000 [1982]), 356. Foucault also adds that he thinks it is “somewhat arb itrary to try to 
dissociate the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and the spatial distributions in 
which they find themselves.” Ibid. Effectively, Foucault’s point is that a scheme of organization cannot be separated 
from the way the scheme is lived and experienced by the actual practitioners of it. For example, collective self-rule 
(that is, democracy) can only be free if the participants choose to exercise the opportunity for freedom. What 
Foucault means by this is  complex, and I do not want to devote the space here to explaining his view, but it suffices 
to say that he is skeptical of utopic programs presented as automatically liberating and instead wants to focus on the 
practices in which individuals engage, whether or not the individuals are part of such programs . 
     
22
 Jameson, “Utopia as Method,” 23. 
     
23
 Ibid., 26. 
D Y S ( U ) T O P I A  | 11 
 
“hermeneutic nor a political program” (a phrase in which the essential term is “program,” since 
Jameson is advancing a hermeneutic, just not a hermeneutical program).24 Without eliminating 
the possibility for interpretative openness, Jameson merely wants to propose some of the forms 
the interpretation might take.  
Jameson draws on Foucault and Nietzsche to suggest a “genealogy” of the future, which 
he understands to be a “logical operation” that looks neither for the causes nor the “outlines” of a 
utopian future in the present but instead for the “logical preconditions” of the “appearance of a 
given phenomenon” without implying that the preconditions directly caused the later 
phenomena.25 He writes, “The operation itself, however, consists in a prodigious effort to change 
the valences on phenomena that so far exist only in our own present and experimentally to 
declare positive things that are clearly negative in our own world, to affirm that dystopia is in 
reality utopia if examined more closely, to isolate specific features in our empirical present so as 
to read them as components of a different system.”26 Thus he characterizes Marxism as both a 
“practical project as well as a space of the investment of unconscious forces,” and he outlines 
that a “Marxist politics … is also a conception of historical dynamics that posits that the whole 
new world is objectively in emergence all around us, without our necessarily perceiving it at 
once, so that alongside our conscious praxis and our strategies for producing change, we may 
take a more receptive and interpretive stance.”27 As the material conditions of the world change, 
the argument goes, especially those material conditions related to the control of the forces of 
production, the world itself undergoes an alteration that can be received (and produced) as either 
utopic or dystopic in nature.  
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Jameson’s utopia is an interpretive process; those who inhabit the world of these material 
conditions must imagine utopic possibilities and understandings as new “objective conditions” 
emerge. Jameson exemplifies his point through a reading of Walmart that takes into account its 
monopolizing tendencies while simultaneously postulating ways that its mechanisms of 
distribution could be differently wielded. He suggests that Walmart should be seen in terms of 
“the shape of a utopian future looming through the mist, which we must seize as an opportunity 
to exercise the utopian imagination more fully, rather than an occasion for moralizing judgments 
or regressive nostalgia.”28 Those emerging conditions that appear to have the function of turning 
the world into some form of dys(u)topia may in fact be viewed in potentially utopic terms. The 
same technologies may both contribute to benefits for all or benefits for only a few. Utopia thus 
entails a reimagination of existing conditions as full of potential rather than eternally negative. 
Jameson’s main concern is with providing a model for utopian thought that is hampered 
by neither “a weakening of historicity or of the sense of the future; a conviction that fundamental 
change is no longer possible, however desirable; and cynical reason as such” nor the “sheer 
power of excess money accumulated since the last great world war” and the “psychological 
conditioning” of an “omnipresent consumerism.”29 While he explicitly rejects the political 
program variation of utopianism, his aim is still in political in at least a limited sense of the term: 
This kind of prospective hermeneutic is a political act only in one specific sense: as a 
contribution to the reawakening of the imagination of possible and alternate futures, a 
reawakening of that historicity which our system — offering itself as the very end of 
history — necessarily represses and paralyzes. This is the sense in which utopology 
revives long-dormant parts of the mind, unused organs of political, historical, and social 
imagination that have virtually atrophied for lack of use, muscles of praxis we have long 
since ceased exercising, revolutionary gestures we have lost the habit of performing, even 
subliminally. Such a revival of futurity and of the positing of alternate futures is not a 
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political program or even a political practice, but it is hard to see how any durable or 
effective political action could come into being without it.30 
 
Jameson shares the concerns of dys(u)topia — that a totalizing program will necessarily entail 
exclusions. The enclave form of utopian programming is hegemonic within its sphere, and only 
that which is within the sphere is acceptable in the first place. Thus his alternative is to read 
future possibility into the emerging regimes of the present and to adopt a form of utopian 
imagining that is more concerned with clearing out space for political imagination than with 
positing a particular form or program of political action. 
PERSPECTIVISM’S PERSISTENCE 
This, though, does not seem to solve the fundamentally perspectival problem of utopia. 
Even if utopic visions entail an interpretation of newly enfolding conditions rather than the 
imposition of a particular ordering of social relations, there is no way to know that there is a 
“right” or “appropriate” way to interpret such conditions. Jameson responds to claims that his 
method “foregrounds the subject and subjectivity” by relying on the intertwining of objective 
emerging conditions with our always partial ability to apprehend the world around us, but this 
does not seem to solve the problem. He argues that Marxist political programs are always 
accompanied by the need to see the (potential) future in how the present is emerging. Yet 
because Jameson does not and cannot articulate the political program that necessarily ought to 
accompany utopian interpreting (as to do so would be to risk dys(u)topia), he also cannot present 
any sort of guide to what is utopian or dystopian. To conceive of utopia as a method without any 
teleological end guiding interpretation risks (if it is a risk) reduction of utopian interpretation to 
individualistic preference for or distaste of the present state. No matter how bad the conditions 
under which we live are, there is always the possibility of imagining the world in a utopic 
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fashion, and there will likely always be someone willing to imagine it in such a way.31 The 
problem is still perspectival. Jameson’s understanding of dystopia and utopia reduplicates the 
problem that his formulation was meant to solve: casting utopia as interpretation cannot provide 
an uncontestable account of the utopic. As long as we consider utopia to mean something along 
the lines of “a society better than ours” — whether imaginable, achievable, or achieved — it is 
difficult to come to a conclusive understanding of “better” that is not also “worse” for some. 
This is the point made by Octavia Butler in her short story “The Book of Martha,” in 
which a middle-aged woman named Martha meets God. God tasks Martha with “help[ing] 
humankind to survive its greedy, murderous, wasteful adolescence” by “help[ing] to find less 
destructive, more peaceful, sustainable ways to live.”32 After much discussion Martha determines 
that the best way to redirect these aggressive tendencies is through dreams: “Powerful, 
unavoidable, realistic dreams that come every time people sleep.” She says, “I want them to have 
the only possible Utopia. … Each person will have a private, perfect utopia every night — or an 
imperfect one. If they crave conflict and struggle, they get that. If they want peace and love, they 
get that. Whatever they want or need comes to them.”33 Butler explains in the afterword what she 
believes her story means: 
“The Book of Martha” is my utopia story. I don’t like most utopia stories because I don’t 
believe them for a moment. It seems inevitable that my utopia would be someone else’s 
hell. So, of course, I have God demand of poor Martha that she come up with a utopia 
that would work. And where else could it work but in everyone’s private, individual 
dreams?34 
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Butler dramatizes here the inescapably dys(u)topic nature of any totalizing vision, which itself, 
in my view, problematizes Jameson’s interpretative model of utopian imagining. As soon as 
utopia becomes a set of social relations, it has the possibility of becoming oppressive. For Butler 
every pursued utopia is inevitably someone else’s dystopia. In Connolly’s terms, a world of 
being potentially precludes opportunities for becoming. All visions of the world are necessarily 
partial and incomplete, favoring some over others. 
DYSTOPIA AS METHOD: A FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH 
In my view, Jameson’s attempt at a methodological utopia, a form of logic that is not 
only content-less but that cannot effectively or non-problematically be coupled with any vision 
of the good, fails. However, I believe that his approach does have viability as a strategy for 
dystopic imaginings, a viability that it obtains from its grounding (however nominally; indeed, 
the resemblance may be one of nomenclature alone) in Foucauldian and Nietzschean genealogy.  
For Foucault, the task of writing or exploring history is about paying attention to the 
mechanisms of power. He states, “I believe that it is futile to cover our eyes — we must try to go 
to the bottom of things and to face up to them.”35 The tracing of the coming-to-be of a particular 
practice or rationality necessarily involves an excavation of these mechanisms of power, which 
themselves may be obscured by a view of the present as always having been the same. For this 
reason Foucault also endorsed a method called “eventilization,” which entailed showing that 
aspects of human experience assumed to be universal were not. The method also questioned how 
the standard of what “counts as being self-evident, universal, and necessary” came to exist.36 As 
Foucault stated in his 1978-1979 introductory lecture to his series on the birth of biopolitics, 
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“[I]nstead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting with 
universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I would like to 
start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these 
practices.”37  
In some ways Foucault’s historical analysis does to the “real” world what, according to 
Freud, “uncanny”38 texts do to their readers: uncanny texts expose an aspect of the world that 
appeared to function in a particular way and show that it instead functions differently. In Freud’s 
terms, such texts take as their object “something which ought to have been kept concealed but 
which has nevertheless come to light.”39 It is that “class of the terrifying which leads back to 
something long known to us, once very familiar.”40 Freud posits several distinct causes of the 
feeling of uncanniness that I think are relevant to how dystopic texts function. The dystopic can 
be seen as producing a particular type of uncanny effect, one that exposes relations of power as 
hiding under the surface of the world as we experience it. 
When Freud initiates his discussion of the uncanny, he starts with a view taken by an 
individual named E. Jentsch. Jentsch proposed that at least some instances of the uncanny could 
be attributed to ambiguity about whether an object was actually alive or dead and that “epileptic 
seizures and the manifestations of insanity” could be thought of as uncanny because they “excite 
in the spectator the feeling that automatic, mechanical processes are at work, concealed beneath 
the ordinary appearance of animation.”41 Later Freud elaborates that the “ordinary person sees in 
[these conditions] the working of forces hitherto unsuspected in his fellow-man but which at the 
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same time he is dimly aware of in a remote corner of his own being.”42 Finally, Freud also 
discusses the idea of the “double” (for example, a doppelgänger) as something that is 
“considered identical by reason of looking alike” but which is actually different in nature.43 In 
these moments especially, we see instances wherein the person undergoing the uncanny 
experience perceived the world to have existed in a certain way that was in fact actually false.44 
Appearance is duplicitous. The apparent double is actually a separate person or thing. The 
apparent freedom with which an individual was choosing is actually being controlled by some 
type of animistic forces. The world is vastly different from how the person experiencing the 
uncanny took it to be, and it arouses a feeling similar to dread in the individual who learns of this 
new reality. 
This exposure of the world as different from how we previously took it to be is what I 
believe the dystopic accomplishes. I would like to think of dystopia “as method,” as genealogy. 
Jameson is useful in that he seeks to provide an alternative to utopia as place (or structure), but 
this alternative provides little assistance to a literary utopian program due to its utter inability to 
answer, “Why this utopian dream and not that one?” beyond the subjectivity of an individual 
author (and whatever reasons they might be able to provide). Certainly utopian imaginings can 
be viewed as articulating the “limits of our imagination,” and they also may be interpretations of 
potential emerging “good,” but this emerging good cannot itself be justified. Dystopian 
imaginings viewed similarly potentially suffer from the same danger, but they do not need to; 
instead, while utopian worlds can be articulated as an emerging good, the dystopic imagining can 
be viewed as an excavation of oft-hidden relations of power. Rather than functioning 
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normatively (as Foucault points out, not all relations of power are bad45), the dystopic imaginary 
is a palatable analytic, a tool for exposing all that was thought to be hidden and that some wish 
would have remained hidden. As with Foucault’s genealogical method, the dystopic show the 
ways in which the world that we took to be given is actually contestable. 
In some sense, of course, the dystopic also entails the same subjective element that the 
utopic does. The analysis of power relations must come from a particular point of view. The 
difference, though, is that the dystopic as method can be checked back against the actual 
conditions of the world. That is, if a dystopic imaginary posits a fear that has no substantial 
relationship to reality, then the fear can be critiqued on that basis. Contrarily, the subjective 
element in the utopic is the determination of what counts as a positive emergent relation of 
power and what counts as a negative one. Certainly, most dystopias implicitly condemn the 
relationships(s) of power that they expose, but the question of whether the social order is positive 
or negative is left largely to the reader. For the utopian, the subjective strain runs much deeper; 
to see a condition as utopic is to view it normatively. I want to move us away from looking at 
dystopia as a normative claim and to see it instead as an analytic one46 
This account of dystopia as essentially a fictional genealogy meshes with Foucault’s 
analysis of totalitarian regimes in the first volume of The History of Sexuality (HoS). Foucault 
describes Nazism as “the most cunning and the most naïve (and the former because of the latter) 
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combination of the fantasies of blood and the paroxysms of a disciplinary power.”47 While 
totalitarianism describes a particular set of societies and ideologies with a distinct temporality, a 
totalitarian regime can be seen as a manifestation of disciplinary and normalizing power, though 
one made obvious by the combination of an “extension and intensification of micro-powers” 
with the “oneiric exaltation of a superior blood” (as Foucault describes the Nazi regime).48 In 
other words totalitarian regimes, like dystopic imaginaries, extend the techniques already in 
place, thereby making them readily apparent. In a way, this can also explain why Nazism and 
other totalitarian regimes are often taken as paradigmatic instances of historical dystopia. It is not 
that the techniques these regimes use are new or currently unemployed; it is that they are made 
apparent in an unusual or extraordinary way. Nazism and all similar totalitarian regimes simply 
do not obscure (in the same way) the artificiality of the mechanisms of power they are 
employing. Walmart, as Jameson shows, is somewhat similar. What is “bad” about it is already 
widely known, and the store has resigned itself to being represented as such.49 Thus, as Connolly 
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       I recall experiencing great degrees of terror while reading this essay. Surely it was wrong. The purposes of 
schooling were benign — schooling was a project aimed at teaching, nothing more. I put the matter out of my mind 
and went on to read whatever less-memorable texts were assigned throughout the rest of the course. This one, 
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pointed out above, all social orders favor some over others by particular mechanisms of power. 
Certain social orders, especially authoritarian and totalitarian orders, demonstrate more clearly 
whom they are privileging. They extend and exaggerate the disciplinary powers in question until 
they are made obvious. The dystopic, I am arguing, functions identically, albeit in a fictional 
form. It takes a particular aspect of society and exaggerates it until it is more easily grasped than 
a complex analysis of society writ large. 
To demonstrate how the literary format of dystopia pursues this aim, I would like to turn 
to two dystopic texts: The Giver and Android. Both of these works are considered to be dystopic. 
My reasons for choosing these works are twofold. First, both were very popular, albeit during 
different eras. The Giver was published in 1993 and was the winner of both the Newberry Medal 
and the William Allen White Award, among others.50 It is read by many to be a dystopic work51 
even though Lowry denies having intended it as such.52 It was made into a movie released in 
2014. Android is similarly popular. It was first published in 1968 and was the source material for 
the film Blade Runner in 1982. Beyond mere popularity, though, both texts also touch on 
important issues that have been addressed by political theory. The Giver has as a central theme 
the role of language in producing subjects, while Android deals with the construction of some 
lives as valuable and others as disposable. Both of these issues are deeply intertwined with real-
world practices; the dystopic form simply exaggerates and makes them obvious so that they may 
be better analyzed and understood. I will first discuss The Giver and then will examine Android 
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with the goal of showing how each text takes a particular political issue as its focus and 
demonstrating this issue’s relationship to real political practice. In so doing, I hope to prove the 
utility and benefit of viewing utopia as an analytic rather than as a normative production.  
THE GIVER AND LANGUAGE 
I turn first to The Giver. The book follows a young boy named Jonas who lives in a 
futuristic community. In this community, each aspect of everyday life is monitored and 
regimented. Elders of the village are elected, but they maintain total control over the lives of 
everyday civilians. Vocations are assigned, children and marriages are applied for and 
orchestrated by committees, and those unfit for life within the community are euthanized. 
Finally, all memories of a life beyond the community are located within a single individual: the 
Receiver of Memory. Jonas is assigned the job of Receiver, and he must procure memories from 
the past Receiver, who calls himself the Giver.  
The community of The Giver employs a variety of specific techniques of language 
regulation and bodily control. Each evening, the family unit discusses the feelings each of its 
members had throughout the day. They then talk about these feelings until the feelings are 
resolved and the member is brought back to a state of “normalcy.” This practice mirrors a similar 
one that occurs each morning after breakfast, where each member of the family shares the 
dreams that he or she had the night before, and then they discuss those dreams as a group. 
Finally, there is a practice of ritualistic apology that occurs whenever one citizen violates, 
intentionally or unintentionally, any rule of the community (especially the rule against rudeness):  
Jonas grinned, remembering the morning that Asher [his best friend] had dashed into the 
classroom, late as usual, arriving breathlessly in the middle of the chanting of the 
morning anthem. When the class took their seats at the conclusion of the patriotic hymn, 
Asher remained standing to make his public apology as was required.  
 
“I apologize for inconveniencing my learning community.” …  
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“We accept your apology, Asher.” The class recited the standard response in unison.53 
  
Here we have regulatory speech across a variety of formats. The students “chant” the patriotic 
hymn. Asher must stand to apologize in front of the entire class, and the class must collectively 
decide to absolve (or not to absolve) Asher. The individual is shown to be separate from the 
community at the same time that the community takes demonstrable preference over the 
individual. Required apologies suppress deviant action while collective absolving generates the 
group capable of such suppression. 
The techniques articulated by the book are productive of dystopic conditions. Speech is 
everywhere, and everywhere it is required. On this point, the text holds a magnifying glass up to 
the world, exaggerating (if only slightly) the techniques that Foucault sets out in the first volume 
of HoS; language is often employed to produce identity categories of “normal” and “aberrant.” In 
The Giver, normalizing power is employed to maintain the status quo in the society; the 
techniques of regulation are eerie and “dystopic” precisely because they reflect and extend the 
micro-powers that actually exist.  Foucault writes that his aim in HoS is to uncover why 
“sexuality [has] been so widely discussed” and what the “effects of power generated by what 
was said” were.54 The question is not whether sex was talked about but the way in which it was 
discussed and the effects that resulted from it. Foucault points to a variety of specific techniques, 
such as the institution of the requirement of confession, which entailed the “nearly infinite task 
of telling — telling oneself and another, as often as possible, everything that might concern the 
interplay of innumerable pleasure, sensations, and thoughts which, through the body and the 
soul, had some affinity with sex.”55 Sex, Foucault notes, was “in the nature of a public potential; 
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it called for management procedures; it had to be taken charge of by analytical discourses.”56 
Thus, speech about sexuality is regulated as a means of regulating sexuality itself, and this 
management of sexuality has a relationship to external concerns such as those of population and 
the economy.57 
The Giver’s treatment of the requirement to speak effectively functions the same way. 
Speech constrains thought and action, so “precision of language” is emphasized as a way of 
ensuring that communication can occur without misunderstanding. Jonas, for example, recalls 
having received a lecture for saying as a child that he was “starving” instead of merely hungry,58 
and his parents laugh and admonish him when he asks them whether they “love” — a term he 
has only learned through the reception of memories — him: 
There was an awkward silence for a moment. Then Father gave a little chuckle. “Jonas. 
You, of all people. Precision of language, please!” 
 
“What do you mean?” Jonas asked. Amusement was not at all what he had anticipated. 
 
“Your father means that you used a very generalized word, so meaningless that it’s 
become almost obsolete,” his mother explained carefully. 
 
Jonas stared at them. Meaningless? He had never before felt anything as meaningful as 
the memory. 
 
“And of course our community can’t function smoothly if people don’t use precise 
language.”59 
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His parents suggest alternative phrasings such as, “Do you enjoy me?” or, “Do you take pride in 
my accomplishments?”60 The question of love is stripped of any meaning beyond what could be 
immediately useful to the community, and thus the term itself is banished from common usage. 
The term is dangerous. It threatens to disrupt the established order. Jonas understands love, but 
he must restrict his language to terms such as “enjoy” and ideas such as “pride in my 
accomplishments” so that his language reflects what is productive for the community. 
The same is true insofar as the libidinal energies manifested by Jonas must be repressed. 
When Jonas has a dream one night in which he is attempting to convince his female friend Fiona 
to undress and enter a tub of water so that he can bathe her, he is made to begin taking a daily 
pill that will prevent “Stirrings” 61 from returning.62 His mother and father, as well as some of his 
friends who have also begun to have the Stirrings, also take the pill each day. In a society where 
Birthmother is a vocation and children are assigned, there is no need for sex. It is disruptive to 
the established order’s regularities. This requirement also creates an opportunity to rebel; one of 
Jonas’s first acts of resistance is to stop taking the pill. This act only becomes an act of resistance 
because of the productive power of speech. By exposing his internal states, he opens himself up 
for regulation and suppression, a suppression he ultimately fights. Were it not for the 
requirement to speak, there would be no clear way to identify when the pill became necessary, 
but because of the central function of speech, the pill occupies an essential position. 
The Giver not only exemplifies the way that speech can function to regulate and produce 
identities but also the ways that silence can be a space that allows for an individual to resist the 
                                                                 
     
60
 Ibid. 
     
61
 Interestingly enough, this term is also used by Foucault when he highlights the “shifting [of] the most 
important moment of transgression from the act itself to the stirrings — so difficult to perceive and formulate — of 
desire.” Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 19-20. 
     
62
 Ibid., 34-39. 
D Y S ( U ) T O P I A  | 25 
 
regulations of power. This first becomes apparent after Jonas is given the guidelines for training 
to become the next Receiver of Memory. Four of his eight rules are related to speech: he is 
exempted from rules governing rudeness and may ask any questions of any other citizen, he may 
not discuss his training with anyone else in the community, he is no longer allowed to tell his 
dreams when his family does so in the mornings, and finally, he is permitted to tell lies. Of these, 
two forbid him from speaking, one — the exemption from rudeness — allows him to speak 
where he was previously silent, and the final rule — the exemption from lying — both allows 
him to speak and to be silent. 
It is the permission to lie that Jonas finds the most radical of all the rules. While 
contemplating the prohibition on dream telling, he wonders what he is supposed to do if he does 
indeed have a dream: “What if he did dream — should he simply tell his family unit, as he did so 
often, anyway, that he hadn’t? That would be a lie. Still, the final rule said … well, he wasn’t 
quite ready to think about the final rule on the page.”63 Jonas reflects on the lifetime of teaching 
that has taught him not to lie; even the emphasis on using precise language, he realizes, is in 
place to “ensure that unintentional lies were never uttered.”64 Thus, the exemption from lying is 
in some ways an exemption from a regulation of his speech. He no longer must ensure that every 
word he uses aptly captures the idea that he is intending to convey (supposing this is possible in 
the first place). 
Wendy Brown provides a framework for understanding the role of silence within a 
Foucauldian discourse in her essay “Freedom’s Silences.” Brown contests that speech and 
silence are opposites, instead arguing, along with Foucault, that the injunction to speech is as 
much an effect of power as are compelled silences. But if power compels speech, then can 
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silence not in some instances be liberating? Silences can often function as a space that is free 
from regulation. She writes, “This conceit [that speech and silence are opposites] enables both 
the assumption that censorship converts the truth of speech to the lie of silence and the 
assumption that when an enforced silence is broken, what emerges is truth borne by the vessel of 
authenticity of experience.”65 Speech is not necessarily emancipatory. Silence may at times be 
more liberating. Brown states, “In the course of this inquiry, silence is considered as not simply 
an aesthetic but a political value, a means of preserving certain practices and dimensions of 
existence from regulatory power, from normative violence, as well as from the scorching rays of 
public exposure.”66 That which is spoken is constantly open to further production and discipline. 
As such, the permissibility of lying provides Jonas a space where he can resist the 
normalizing functions of speech. Brown writes, “Foucault … marks the ambiguity of silence in 
relationship to power, insisting that silence functions not only as a ‘shelter for power’ but also as 
a shelter from it.”67 Silence, Brown notes, may not be a space that is completely free from the 
organizations of power, but it is still a space that can in some instances exist in a way not yet 
accounted for by discourse — not in the sense that silence is not organized by power, but in the 
sense that silence can be a space that does not actively aid in the production of particular kinds of 
subjects and from which resistance to power’s normalizing effects is possible.68 
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Jonas’s first lie to his parents takes “refuge from power”69 in the shelter of silence. He 
actively resists the normalizing effects that regulation of his speech would entail, thereby 
abstaining from the injunction to speak that plays a significant role in the production of 
discourse. After Jonas’s parents kindly chastise him for using the word love, his mother asks 
whether he “understand[s]” why the use of the term love is “inappropriate”: “Jonas nodded. ‘Yes, 
thank you, I do,’ he replied slowly. / It was his first lie to his parents.”70 Precision of language is 
intended to diminish the potential for lying, and accuracy in descriptive language (and the 
constant confession of thoughts and feelings) produces a subject that abides by the rules of the 
community without questioning them.71 Jonas resists this subjection by deigning not to engage in 
the discursive ordering of speech. In other words, if certain words are considered too imprecise 
for use because the feelings that they represent no longer exist, then to understand and to use 
them is to resist the elimination of those feelings from the society. But if Jonas attempts to speak 
those terms, then they will be taken from him, and he will be made to use other terms. By telling 
his parents that he understands why the use of certain “imprecise” terms is inappropriate, he 
resists engaging in a regulatory system that would be to excise the word from his lexicon. For 
Jonas, then, the possibility and permissibility of lying, even if it is only because permission to do 
so has been granted within an already constructed discourse, is a site of potential freedom from 
subject production.72 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
still serve as a space where freedom can be found by some (but not by all; alleged terrorists being tortured are 
excluded altogether from the discourse of rights, finding no space of silence in which to dwell). We can see then that 
both intervals of silence carved out by the law as well as lacunas in the law (e.g. the failure to regulate lesbian sexual 
practice) can function as spaces in which resistance against power can find its locus and from where liberty can 
consequently be practiced. 
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The regulation of speech, then, certainly plays an important role in the workings of 
Jonas’s community. It presumes a specific and previously delineated set of identities and internal 
states and only recognizes those verbally. For example, throughout the text, individuals are 
referred to as male and female and only in those terms. Despite a policy of “Sameness,” which 
makes it rude to point out anything different about anyone else, there are still identified and 
encoded differences in gender and sex. Similarly, every parental pairing discussed is 
heterosexual. At every level within Jonas’s community, language serves a regulatory function in 
the production of identity, but it does so in an extreme fashion. Whereas a scheme of discourses 
may play the same role in our society, it does not do so to the same extent that it odes in the 
community in The Giver. The community in The Giver dramatizes what happens every day. It 
makes extreme the production of identity via discourse, thereby exposing the micro-techniques 
to scrutiny, even if it is only a scrutiny of an exaggerated form. 
If this is a technique dramatized in the novel, though, it is not necessarily its aim. That is, 
the fear the work expresses is not merely that we will be regulated, and as such, we must 
examine why the regulation in the text is occurring. At what do the disciplinary mechanisms the 
Community employs aim? One of the most important themes (and one that is directly tied to the 
role of language) in The Giver is the role that memory plays in the production of meaning for 
individuals and communities. As Jonas acquires new experiences, his world acquires a depth that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
community regulates what lives can be apprehended as existing. For example, each citizen is called only by a 
number prior to receiving a name in a group ceremony for one-year-old children, at which time each child is also 
placed in a family. Until a child is given to a family, it cannot be given a name. It is only within the social context of 
the community that the lives become valuable. This becomes further apparent when Jonas is inquiring  of his parents 
what his position as the Receiver of Memory will entail. His parents describe for him the last time a Receiver was 
chosen, but when Jonas asks what the Receiver’s name was, his parents refuse to tell him: “His mother replied, ‘Her, 
not his. It was a female. But we are never to speak the name, or to use it again for a newchild.’ / Jonas was shocked. 
A name designated Not-to-Be-Spoken indicated the highest degree of disgrace.” Likewise, the text notes that when 
children misbehave, their parents sometimes call them by their number instead of by their name in order to indicate 
that “mischief made one unworthy of a name.” Thus, in Jonas’s community, only those individuals who act in 
accordance with what is desired of them by the community can be considered full members of it. Otherwise, they are 
treated as if they did not exist — if they exist, it is a worthless existence. 
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was not previously present. In interviews with the author, she has claimed that the focus on 
memory was her primary reason for writing the book, recounting that her elderly father began to 
lose his memory, which caused him to forget tragic events such as the death of his 28-year-old 
daughter. Lowry stated, “I began to think about writing a book about people who had found a 
way to manipulate human memory so [that] they wouldn’t have to remember anything bad.”73 
According to Lowry’s account, the book is fundamentally about excising memory from humans 
in order that their lives may be less painful. 
If we look to what the techniques of regulation accomplish in the community, we can see 
that they are fundamentally aimed at this end: the elimination of pain and suffering. This theme 
becomes most apparent early in Jonas’s training. When The Giver is explaining the pain that 
Jonas will experience, Jonas asks, “But why can’t everyone have the memories? I think it would 
seem a little easier if the memories were shared. You and I wouldn’t have to bear so much by 
ourselves, if everybody took a part.”74 To this, The Giver responds, “You’re right. … But then 
everyone would be burdened and pained. They don’t want that. And that’s the real reason The 
Receiver is so vital to them, and so honored.”75 The Receiver remembers so that the people may 
forget. The forgetting is neither complete nor unguided, but the memories that the townspeople 
retain are only those that would be useful in establishing and maintaining the civil order that they 
have constructed. For example, the classes that they teach in school are language and 
communications, commerce and industry, science and technology, and civil procedures and 
government.76 Knowledge (and therefore memory) of these types of subjects is maintained; the 
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collected history of “scientific” disciplines is maintained without any sort of generalized history 
explaining why and how those disciplines have come about. 
Simultaneously, though, the “forgetting” of the non-scientific disciplines is not a 
complete forgetting. The remainder of the memories that Jonas is required to keep, while not 
strictly utilitarian in nature, are reduced to utilitarian in function, at least insofar as the 
community is concerned. The Giver notes to Jonas that he is only ever called upon to provide 
advice to the Committee of Elders in times when they “are faced with something that they have 
not experienced before. … But it very seldom happens.”77 The function of the Receiver of 
Memory is not to enrich the experiences of those within the community by providing context to 
their activities but to provide a minimal degree of assistance to those who are in control, and he 
is only employed when the elders find themselves in a situation that they do not understand. It is 
not just that The Receiver and The Giver are treated as vessels for the unwanted memories of the 
community but that they are made to discuss those memories for the sake of their repression. The 
memories are incorporated into a discourse (purportedly) aimed at their suppression, but the 
suppression is partial. The discourse only encourages the suppression of memory where there is 
the potential for lasting pain, whether physical or psychological. Thus Jonas may not take any 
medicine to eliminate pain related to his training, even though everyone else is permitted to have 
their pain instantly dulled by means of medical advances.78 
The Giver deals with two primary themes. The first is the way that discourses regulate the 
terms used by (and consequently the relations between) the members of the community in order 
to produce a particular type of subjects. The second is the relationship between the techniques of 
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power employed and the collective “forgetting” undergone by the community. There is a certain 
degree of ignorance that allows the members of the community to be controlled. Interestingly, 
this is implicit in Foucault’s historical rejection of the “Repressive Hypothesis” in HoS. Rather 
than accepting that power has function only to say “no” to sexual desire, Foucault instead 
examines historically how language has functioned. His contextualization of the function of sex 
across several centuries is what allows him to identify the workings of power. Similarly, while 
Foucault argues that resistance to power exists everywhere power is exercised,79 seemingly 
implying that resistance to power can occur passively, it does not seem a far stretch from his 
argument to surmise that it takes an understanding of power’s functions to resist it actively. This 
is what occurs for Jonas; he becomes aware of how power is working, and this allows him better 
to conceive resistances to it. Thus, The Giver is both a story of control and a story of resistance 
to control, resistance only made possible by the knowledge of how the control is functioning. 
DO ANDROIDS DREAM OF ELECTRIC SHEEP?, OR, ARE ALL LIVES EQUAL? 
A similar theme is present in Phillip K. Dick’s Android. However, the “resistance” in 
Android is not undertaken by the “protagonist” of the story, as it is in The Giver, but rather by 
those against whom he is operating. The story uses experiential knowledge, namely, the 
knowledge and experience of empathy, to question what lives count as existing or salvageable as 
opposed to disposable. In Android, a bounty hunter named Rick Deckard works for the police in 
a futuristic, post-apocalyptic San Francisco to “retire” any androids that have escaped to Earth. 
These androids are made of organic material rather than mechanical parts. The story is set after 
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World War Terminus, a worldwide nuclear war of unspecified proportions that has left the planet 
covered in radioactive dust. This dust has killed a majority of the animal life on the planet, and 
its alleged detrimental effect on humans has caused many to emigrate to other planets to avoid a 
supposed “degeneration” of their mental and physical capabilities. 
In Android, memories play an essential role. Many of the androids have artificial 
memories implanted into them at creation, which means that some do not even realize that they 
are androids. At one point Rick meets another bounty hunter named Phil Resch. Resch’s boss, 
Garland, is discovered to be an android, and Garland confides to Deckard that Resch is also an 
android. After they have killed Garland, Deckard conveys this news to Resch, who frantically 
attempts to determine whether his memories of having worked in his job for at least three years 
and the fact that he owns a pet squirrel (thereby demonstrating his capacity for empathy) mean 
that he is actually human and not an android with implanted memories. He asks Deckard to 
administer an empathy test to him, claiming that he will kill himself if the test proves him an 
android. (He turns out to be human.) 
The android, then, is a category of disposable life, a not-quite-human human, the 
presence of which on Earth sufficiently disrupts the everyday so as to merit violent action against 
it. The androids are considered dangerous especially because they are sentient creatures allegedly 
lacking empathy, especially for each other; it is frequently mentioned that an android would turn 
another over to the police if it thought it would help to save itself. This lack of empathy results 
from a lack of memory similar to that of the community in The Giver. While the androids in 
Android have some degree of intelligence and recollection, they are said not to be able to grasp 
reasons that are not purely intellectual, that is, emotional justifications for action (though the text 
undermines this claim consistently). Any motivations based on a characteristic such as empathy 
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are said to be alien to them; their knowledge is entirely “scientific.” It is only useful for a 
diagnostic of how the world functions without explaining why it could matter that the world is 
such a way. For the androids, it may not be that they have forgotten the actual events that have 
occurred in their “lives” but that they cannot experience them in the same fashion as humans can. 
While the surface of the text sharply divides the human and replicant worlds, tsunami 
forces roil under apparently placid waves, and the actions of the characters (more than what they 
say) muddy these waters significantly, making ambiguous the bifurcation between androids and 
humans. The androids seem to feel something for their own kind, whereas Deckard’s thoughts 
and feelings are conveyed in almost mechanistic, robotic terms. After arriving on the planet, 
several of the androids stay in a group in order to maximize their chances of survival. Three of 
the six, Roy and Irmgard Baty and Pris Stratton, stay in two apartments in a mostly deserted 
apartment complex in the suburbs outside of San Francisco. Though their primary objective is 
survival, Roy sets up a warning system that can only be triggered by humans that will allow him 
and Irmgard to come to Pris’s aid if a bounty hunter comes after her. When Deckard arrives, Roy 
and Irmgard do not simply head for the hills; they stay together to the bitter end. When Deckard 
kills Irmgard Baty, Roy “let[s] out a cry of anguish,” and Deckard responds, “Okay, you loved 
her. … And I loved Rachel.”80 Despite all claims to the contrary, the androids seem to have 
affection for each other. The decision of some of the androids to stick together could be reduced 
simply to the desire on the part of each android to escape “retirement” at Deckard’s hands, 
though the apparent pain that the androids express after their fellow androids have been killed 
makes this reading difficult. (For example, when Pris is told by Roy Baty that several of the 
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other androids have been killed, the text states that the “joy which had appeared on Pris’s face at 
seeing her friends at once melted away.”81) 
Similarly, Rachel Rosen, an android owned by the largest android-manufacturing 
company in the world, meets Deckard with the ostensible goal of helping him kill the escaped 
androids that he is pursuing. Rosen appears distressed when she learns that one of the androids 
that has escaped is the same model that she is. If she helps Deckard, she will effectively be 
killing a version of “herself.” She expresses this in conversation with Deckard:  
“You know what I have? Toward this Pris android?”  
 
“Empathy,” he said.  
 
“Something like that. Identification; there goes I. My god; maybe that's what'll happen. In 
the confusion you'll retire me, not her. And she can go back to Seattle and live my life. I 
never felt this way before. We are machines, stamped out like bottle caps. It's an illusion 
that I — I — personally — really exist; I'm just representative of a type.” She 
shuddered.82 
 
Despite this, Rachel offers an interpretation of her reaction that eliminates empathy for others. 
She states, “I’m empathetic about myself. And, see, if I go to that suburban broken-down conapt 
building— … I don’t dare go because androids have no loyalty to one another and I know that 
that goddamn Pris Stratton will destroy me and occupy my place.”83 Rachel even promises to kill 
Stratton herself if Deckard will sleep with her. 
After sleeping with Deckard, though, Rachel reveals to him that her true intention was to 
make it difficult for him to kill other androids, claiming, “No bounty hunter has ever gone on. … 
After being with me. Except one.” 84 When Deckard decides to kill the androids anyway, Rachel 
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responds by killing a pet goat he had purchased with some of his reward money. Rachel clearly 
seems to be empathetic even though she presents herself as having no empathy. Rachel’s killing 
of Deckard’s goat cannot be explained in any other way; Rachel is taking vengeance on Deckard. 
There is no reason for her to do so other than the empathy that she seems to deny possessing.  
It is not only the claim that androids do not feel empathy that is contestable, though. The 
assertion that empathy is the feature that allows humans to be distinguished from androids 
becomes contestable the more sophisticated that the android models become. Before Deckard is 
permitted by his boss to begin pursuing the androids, he is first made to go to the headquarters of 
the Rosen Corporation to determine whether the Voight-Kampff test, which differentiates 
between humans and androids on the basis of the subject’s responses to a variety of emotional 
situations, works on the newest model of androids released by the Rosen Corporation: the 
Nexus-6 model. The fear, as expressed by a group of Soviet psychiatrists, is that the Voight-
Kampff scale “applied to a carefully selected group of schizoid and schizophrenic human 
patients.”85 In other words, for certain humans, those who demonstrate a “flattening of affect,” 
the scale that is meant to identify androids as androids would apply to them as well. 
The ironic aspect of the fear that the test might identify some humans is that the humans 
it would register have the same characteristic that allegedly makes the androids dangerous. 
Deckard is hunting androids because they lack empathy, but he is trying to ensure that the test 
will not accidentally target humans on the same grounds. Humans with no empathy must be 
protected, but androids must be destroyed because they have no empathy.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
working for a significant portion of the book). Unless she had unwittingly employed this tactic prior to having 
learned that she was an android, the two moments seem (probably intentionally) incongruous and unexplainable in 
any sort of rationalist logic (in other words, some portion of the story must be false in order for the events to make 
sense together). This seems to be something of a theme throughout the book. For example, when Deckard meets one 
of the androids, the text progresses at a normal rate until conflict suddenly arises between the two of them (and 
leaves the android dead). The jumping around seems to me to be an aspect of the text’s focus on alienation insofar as 
the experience of the reader is one of defamiliarity (or at least confusion) with the textual experience . 
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A lack of feeling is not limited to the small “schizoid” population of Earth, though. It is 
spread across the human inhabitants of Earth. Deckard’s wife, Iran, is the first to bring it up. She 
is explaining to Deckard why she has set her Penfield mood organ, a device that alters the mental 
states of the users, to provide her with a “six-hour self-accusatory depression.”86 She explains 
that once while home alone, she turned off the television and was overwhelmed by the silence of 
the apartment complex: 
“At that moment,” Iran said, “when I had the TV sound off, I was in a 382 mood; I had 
just dialed it. So although I heard the emptiness intellectually, I didn't feel it. My first 
reaction consisted of being grateful that we could afford a Penfield mood organ. But then 
I realized how unhealthy it was, sensing the absence of life, not just in this building but 
everywhere, and not reacting — do you see? I guess you don't. But that used to be 
considered a sign of mental illness; they called it ‘absence of appropriate affect.’ So I left 
the TV sound off and I sat down at my mood organ and I experimented. And I finally 
found a setting for despair.” Her dark, pert face showed satisfaction, as if she had 
achieved something of worth. “So I put it on my schedule for twice a month; I think that's 
a reasonable amount of time to feel hopeless about everything, about staying here on 
Earth after everybody who's small has emigrated, don't you think?”87 
 
Deckard’s wife is using the mood organ in a way that remedies her diminished capacity to feel 
empathy. Her affect exists at a “flattened” level. Even as the society constructs the lack of 
empathy as a danger or a “disorder” that must be regulated among humans or destroyed among 
non-humans, it provides mechanisms to hide that same feeling on the part of humans. Finally, the 
androids also describe their condition in the same terms; Pris tells a human that she and her 
fellow androids are “schizophrenic, with defective emotional lives — flattening of affect, it’s 
called.”88 Yet the same mental and emotional state that the androids allegedly experience, that 
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makes them “dangerous,” is sought after by Deckard’s wife because she considers it healthy to 
feel this way from time to time. 89 
 Thus, the regulation of what it means to count as a life worthy of protection on Earth in 
2019 is facially tied to empathy but in actuality tied to the nature of the life in question: is the life 
manufactured by humans via corporations or copulation? There are admittedly some differences 
between the humans and the androids. The Voight-Kompff test primarily registers androids for a 
reason, and the alarm that Roy constructs will only be tripped if a human of a certain mental 
capacity is present. However, the androids still register strong reactions to a majority of the 
situations that are examined under the Voight-Kompff test, simply not in the same way that 
humans register reactions to them. Additionally, the difference in biological constitution 
registered by the alarms is unrelated to the arguments about empathy that are used to justify the 
hunting and killing of the androids. At base, the androids are constructed as an undesirable life 
form for no other reason than that they do not fit the biological paradigm for valuable life.90 
Value is ontogenetic; the androids are the “other” that unites the humans and who are 
consequently “justifiably” used by them as slaves in the off-planet colonies. If the life of the 
androids is not understood as of equal value to the life of the humans, then the humans can rule 
the androids with impunity, having them perform whatever tasks they desire and killing them 
without guilt or legal reckoning. 
                                                                 
     
89
 I feel that it is impossible to discuss the construction of the androids as creatures without empathy without 
bringing up an important scene in which Pris cuts several legs off of a spider to see how few legs it truly needs to 
walk. Ibid., 203-210. The text in that moment seems to use it to demonstrate that the androids are truly “other,” that 
they lack a characteristic that is unique to humans. Of course, the moment itself is situated in a world where a 
scientific “curiosity,” not unlike that expressed by Pris before beginning to cut off legs, has led to the destruction of 
significantly larger lifeforms generally considered to be more desirable. Owls and toads, for instance, are extinct in 
the world of Android. That Pris’s curious dissection of the spider and the androids’ purported lack of empathy for 
each other serves as the basis for their persecution is ironic situated in a world that bears the aftereffects of the 
identical human tendencies spread across a much larger scale.  
     
90
 Further discussion on the construction of some lives as valuable and others as disposable can be found in 
Chapter Two. 
38 | T H E  S O M E W H E R E  W E  W I S H  W E R E  N O W H E R E  
 
The construction of some lives as valuable and others as disposable works in two 
directions. Humans affirm their own value by devaluing androids, but they also affirm their own 
value by setting some experiences aside that they may have but the androids may not.91 An entire 
religion — Mercerism — arises around the ideal of empathy. By making use of a machine called 
an “empathy box,” individuals across the various worlds may share in a “group mind” type of 
experience in which they are allegedly able to share the thoughts and feelings of other users. The 
entire experience centers on a figure called Wilbur Mercer, who begins in a pit of bones before 
leaving the pit and climbing up a mountainside. Once at the top, Wilbur again descends to the pit 
of dead things, after which the entire journey begins again. Users of the empathy box become the 
figure of Mercer; they lose their identity to experience a collective consciousness. However, 
during the course of the novel, Mercer, who is generally believed to be real in some sense of the 
term (in the same way, for example, that Jesus is usually thought by most to have existed even if 
they do not believe that he was divine), is proven to be no more than an actor who was filmed 
against a generic background. The tenets of the religion are constructed on the reality of a 
fictitious being. 
The religion, though, is unlikely to die out, precisely because it is an experience 
unavailable to the androids. In fact, Irmgard Baty rants, “Isn’t it a way of proving that humans 
can do something we can’t do? Because without the Mercer experience we just have your word 
that you feel this empathy business, this shared, group thing.”92 The religion or cult or experience 
of Mercer lives on (or is at least presented as if it will live on beyond the end of the book) 
because it is an experience, contingent and constructed, that separates certain humans from the 
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androids. Again, though, not all humans participate in it. Rick, whose job requires that he not 
have the empathy he develops for the androids, takes care to avoid it, yet in the course of killing 
the androids, he comes to see himself as Mercer. Mercer appears to him in visions and tells him 
that killing the androids is wrong but something that he must do,93 and after killing the androids, 
Deckard believes that he has “permanently fused with [Mercer].”94 To reject his feelings of 
empathy for the androids, Deckard must subscribe to a dubious ideology that constructs the 
androids as other, and after he goes about killing the androids (again, thereby rejecting his 
empathy for them), he believes that he has become a figure that is the epitome of empathy. 
Android then is a story of conformity for Deckard. He is the anti-Jonas in that he comes to 
understand, in at least some partial way, the illegitimacy of hunting and killing androids yet 
continues to do so anyway. He recognizes the way that power is functioning, but because it is 
functioning on his behalf, he refuses to resist it.95 
But as with The Giver, it is not enough to analyze the mechanisms of disciplinary power, 
in this case those that construct some lives as valuable and others as disposable. We must look at 
what these categories produce. Here I think it is helpful to turn to the author’s articulation of his 
own aims. In an interview, Dick stated that for him, the book “stemmed from [his] basic interest 
in the problem of differentiating the people who are physiologically human but behaving in a 
nonhuman way.”96 Dick also noted that he wrote the work during the Vietnam War and that part 
of his concern was whether it “might become necessary to fight” people who, like the androids, 
lacked empathy and whether it would be possible to maintain empathy in the course of the 
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fight.97 It seems from his own descriptions that Dick was indeed attempting to portray the 
androids as so separate from humans that they could ultimately be dangerous to humans. 
However, as we have already seen, his actual work undermines this effort. It is not simply that 
Deckard “becomes like an android” but that androids and humans are already essentially the 
same. The benefit of introducing Dick’s analysis is that it highlights an apparent concern in the 
text that otherness may in fact be dangerous. However, rather than actually promoting this view, 
the text’s construction of android life actively undermines it as a legitimate perspective. The 
text’s main concern is in fact how some lives are constructed as worth living and why some 
others are considered to be so dangerous to human existence that they must be eradicated. While 
Dick may have meant to constrain this logic to the specific instances of persons who were 
leading military campaigns overseas, the logic of disposability plays a role in our current politics, 
as we shall see further in the next chapter. Dick does a good job in presenting the issue he 
desired to raise, but he did so in a way that ultimately promoted a point opposed to the one he 
was trying to articulate: to divide life into categories of worthy and unworthy to live is 
dangerous. 
▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
 
Both Android and The Giver are clearly dystopic works. They are both imagined futures 
dealing with societies significantly “worse” than our own. In Android, Earth is uninhabitable, 
which has provided the impetus to conquer other worlds. In The Giver, the world is inhabitable, 
but each individual may only access a small portion of the world. The eradication of memory and 
the implementation of a strictly rule-oriented way of life have led to the creation of a world in 
which individuals rarely seem to leave the space to which they have become accustomed. The 
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dystopic imaginary serves to express concerns about various societal tendencies when those 
tendencies are taken to their extremes. Android deals with fears about the tactics of war that are 
waged when those understood to be living are not valued as human. The Giver is concerned with 
the authoritarianism of a society that is willing to do whatever it takes to be free of pain, no 
matter how much self-regulation such an endeavor would require. Both of these dystopias are 
worlds in which the concerns of the present are shifted into the future. The eradication of the 
“present” — in the sense that these stories are always “potential futures” — as an immediate 
concern functions almost as a control would in a scientific experiment; it allows for the features 
of society that concern the author to be explored without worrying about the details that would 
be essential to any study of those features as they exist within the present. 
It is not always the case, though, that dystopias only ever present problematic 
relationships of power. Sometimes, worlds that could be considered dystopic come with their 
own ready-made solutions, and these responses mark the points of resistance against dystopian 
tendencies. This means that it is essential to understand how dystopia is being constructed in 
order to determine whether the problems being presented have some fair relationship to the real 
world and whether the potential solutions proposed actually get to the heart of the matter. In 
order to explore this issue further, we will turn to the imaginary of the superhero in Chapter Two.  
For Jonas, resistance involved leaving the community. For Deckard, there was a lack of 
resistance. He was assimilated back into the group mind of Mercerism, the mind that constructs 
androids as other in order to eradicate them. Both texts are useful for demonstrating the 
potentialities that exist as responses to dystopic worlds. The Giver’s response is fairly utopic, 
while Android instead demonstrates a dystopic response to the problems of dystopia. The text, 
though, does not seem to indicate that resistance is impossible but only that it may be difficult. It 
42 | T H E  S O M E W H E R E  W E  W I S H  W E R E  N O W H E R E  
 
leaves open the opportunity of resistance to the paradigms it problematizes. In fact, Rachel is a 
better figure of resistance than Deckard. While she does return to the corporation that produces 
her, the action of killing Deckard’s goat is a symbolic act rejecting the prioritization of biological 
life over mechanical life. And, of course, her action leaves Deckard only with a mechanical toad 
and sheep that he owns. His rejection of mechanical life in the form of the android has led to him 
possessing only mechanical pets, a source of shame for him throughout the book. In both novels, 
the dystopia seems to be proposed less for the world that is portrayed and more for the 
demonstration of ways that the dystopic can be resisted, even if the resistance portrayed in the 
text is not successful. Dystopia becomes a problem to be solved, a problem of how best to resist 
the problematic constructions of biopolitical regimes.98 
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TWO 
 
• • • 
 
THE DARK KNIGHT AND DEMOCRACY: BATMAN 
AND THE DANGERS OF SEIZED AUTHORITY 
The form of the dystopic is multiple and varied. Numerable imaginaries fall within its 
boundaries, some more utopic, some less so. One variety of the dystopic can be found in the 
world of the superhero. Superheroes consistently inhabit worlds that are a far cry from our own. 
Crime rates are through the roof; corruption is everywhere; and, of course, some people 
(including criminals) have superhuman capabilities. In the figure of the superhero, we see a 
utopian figure combatting a dystopian reality. Metropolis is under attack, so Superman must save 
it. The world is being attacked by a terrorist organization linked to Nazism, so the Avengers must 
come together to save the world. The paradigmatic superhero episode entails first an imagination 
of dystopia and then the presentation of the superhero as a response or solution to it. In this 
chapter, I would like to explore what fears and mechanisms of power the presentation of 
superhero dystopias expose and what our imagined responses to them are. I will do this 
specifically through an examination of Christopher Nolan’s Dark Knight Trilogy. 
The superhero genre is no freer than any other from the socio-political forces that channel 
the anxieties of society into their expressions across various media. From the movie screen to the 
comic book, the superhero is, by virtue of having been created in a political world, an inherently 
politicized creation. This is especially apparent in the superhero genre’s centrality to the 
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production of culture. Of the top-ten domestic (U.S.) film grosses, four are superhero movies. 
Marvel’s The Avengers (2012) is fifth, The Dark Knight (2008) is sixth, Avengers: Age of Ultron 
(2015) is ninth, and The Dark Knight Rises (2012) is tenth.1 The same is true for thirteen more of 
the top 100. Of these, only one (Batman, 1989) occurred prior to the last decade and a half. More 
than at any prior point in cinematic history, superhero films hold strong sway over the public’s 
imagination. Analyzing the films that are popular with the general public is important in turn 
because these films interpellate and, more importantly, directly produce the subjects who view 
them. These audiences, inhabitants of a seemingly more and more uncertain world marked at 
every turn by dangerous potential futures, are little removed from the public in the world of the 
superhero: the masses who are unable to save themselves in the face of chaotic (often terroristic) 
forces of “evil.” The superhero is a force of good and justice capable of making the world safe 
for the quotidian. The implication? Grave danger is all-pervasive, and it can only be combatted 
by near-absolute, extralegal authority. 
Everyday cultural forces produce subjectivities. In his book Mythologies, Roland Barthes 
states that his analyses were usually inspired by a “feeling of impatience at the sight of the 
‘naturalness’ with which newspapers, art and common sense constantly dress up a reality which, 
even though it is the one we live in, is undoubtedly determined by history.”2 In other words, the 
contestability and malleability of the world we inhabit is often obscured by how we view the 
world that we experience on a daily basis, and everything that is a part of our everyday 
contributes to shaping this world. In the world of the superhero, the “there-ness” of evil is a 
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defining trait; another villain always arises to be combatted by the forces of “truth, justice, and 
the American way.”3 As Marc DiPaolo has described the phenomena in the context of Batman, 
“In his world, villains, following long-standing melodramatic tropes, announce their intentions in 
advance and perform obviously evil acts. There is little need for speculation about their possible 
innocence and no need for ‘absurd’ notions such as due process.”4 Barthes’ distaste for the 
naturalization of a contingent world would find an easy object in the realm of the superhero, a 
world where forces that are evil through and through are a necessity. The audience knows who is 
good, who is evil, and which of those two forces will prevail, and this form of art “dresses up” 
our daily reality until we can no longer see its contestability. 
In this way, the myth of the superhero is not so different from the myths that often visibly 
drive U.S. politics. In fact, the two are deeply intertwined. As Sheldon Wolin puts it, “Their [the 
media’s] vivid representations of the destruction of the Twin Towers, accompanied by 
interpretations that were unwavering and unquestioning, served a didactic end of fixing the 
images of American vulnerability while at the same time testing the potential for cultural control. 
The media produced not only an iconography of terror but a fearful public receptive to being led, 
first by hailing a leader, the mayor of New York, Rudolf Giuliani, and then by following one, the 
president of the United States, George W. Bush.”5 The process of producing subjects who would 
be receptive to the expansion of executive authority in an effort to combat terrorism involved 
first articulating the risk to the wellbeing of the nation’s citizens by imprinting the ever-present 
possibility of danger on their collective consciousness, “an enemy — terrorism — that had no 
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obvious limits, neither temporal nor spatial, nor a single fixed form,”6 and then providing a 
leader who could serve as a solution to or a bulwark against that danger. A truly super hero was 
needed to save the people from the supervillain bent on their destruction. 
It was in this context that the high-grossing superhero films of the early 2000s-2010s 
were released. Included among them was Christopher Nolan’s Dark Knight Trilogy, consisting 
of Batman Begins (2005), The Dark Knight (2008), and The Dark Knight Rises (2012). These 
three films addressed the issue of terrorism in obvious terms (though Christopher Nolan claims 
that, at least for the first movie, he only realized the connections between at least his work and 
terrorism after the film had been completed).7 The films trace Bruce Wayne’s journey from 
bourgeois resident of Gotham City, through his time as Gotham’s primary defender and architect 
of its uneasy peace, to his eventual retirement from and release of the role of Batman. In all three 
films he faces enemies bent on the demise of Gotham: Ra’s al Ghul (and the Scarecrow), the 
Joker, and Bane (along with Talia al Ghul). In this chapter, I examine the Dark Knight Trilogy as 
a dystopia. Gotham is the dystopic situation, with rampant crime and constant terrorist attacks. 
Simultaneously, Batman is a manifestation of the utopian impulse. He presents a solution to the 
problematic of dystopia that Gotham presents. To this end, I discuss the world that Christopher 
Nolan has created, focusing primarily on its villains and the tactics that Batman employs to stop 
them. I also begin to discuss the way that these films help to generate our understandings of the 
real world, a theme that I develop further in the next chapter. 
BATMAN BEGINS WITH A WAR ON TERROR 
The first film deals with the journey of Bruce Wayne into the persona of Batman. It 
begins in medias res, with Wayne in a prison in an unspecified but apparently Asiatic country, 
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which starkly contrasts the opulence of Wayne Manor and its grounds. The audience is left with 
the question, “How did he end up here?” The “here” is a here of complete otherness; the 
criminals are all non-white, and they are out to kill Bruce. While in prison, Bruce is approached 
by a man named Ducard. Ducard offers Bruce the opportunity to work for a man named Ra’s al 
Ghul, who is the head of a group called the League of Shadows.8 Ducard offers Bruce training to 
master his fears so that Bruce can be a part of the League’s mission to bring justice to the world. 
In order to demonstrate his commitment to justice, though, Bruce must kill a local farmer who 
murdered and attempted to steal land from his neighbor. When Bruce says that the man should 
instead be tried, Ducard replies, “By whom? Corrupt bureaucrats? Criminals mock society’s 
laws.”9 Earlier Ducard had also stated that criminals “thrive on the indulgence of society’s 
understanding.”10 Finally, Ducard Gotham is to be destroyed for its criminality and corruption. 
Ducard’s vision of the world is dys(u)topic. It entails punishment and destruction for those who 
have committed “crimes” against the law as determined by the League of Shadows, which 
consequently imposes on the world an order desired only by a few. It exalts extralegal 
punishment as the path to justice. Wayne refuses to be complicit in Ducard/al Ghul’s utopic 
vision, even as he uses extralegal means to impose his own plan of redemption for Gotham.11 
Ra’s al Ghul is a terrorist; fear is the weapon he employs to bring about his political ends. 
In his case it is literal fear as his plan to destroy Gotham entails releasing a toxin that causes   
individuals to see hallucinations. He wants the city to “tear itself apart through fear.”12 This 
“forces Batman to fight a literal ‘war on terror,’”13 in the process employing extralegal 
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mechanisms of security. As DiPaolo writes, al Ghul is “a lunatic who is too driven by ‘righteous’ 
fury and ideology to be reasoned with.”14 Bruce, on the other hand, is the sane, intelligent, moral 
man of the classic comic book adventures.”15 He is wealthy and virtuous. Al Ghul’s fanaticism 
and otherness present, according to the film, a graver threat to Gotham than does Batman’s 
decision to take the law into his own hands. The binaries of neighbor/foreigner, Western/non-
Western, secular reason/religious ideology, and civilian/terrorist are replicated and reinforced 
through the opening scenes, even as Batman adopts Ducard’s mantra that he must “devote 
[him]self to an ideal” and make himself “more than just a man” if he wants to bring a new order 
to Gotham.16 
For DiPaolo the relevant inquiry in Batman’s attempts to fight crime is, “to what extent 
do[es] Batman Begins … present Batman as violating civil rights?”17 Arguably, though, this 
inquiry obscures an even more important question: To what extent does Batman’s triumph over 
al Ghul produce an understanding of the role of executive authority in modern democracy that is 
ultimately inimical to the functioning of democracy generally? The question of civil rights is an 
important one, but it is secondary, in my view, to whether executive authority ought to be 
curtailed in the face of extreme danger, especially when that expansion appears to be necessary 
to save the public. It is only by operating outside of the law that Batman is ultimately able to do 
what is necessary to save the city. Gotham’s law has been practiced in a way that benefits the 
wealthy, both businessmen and crime bosses, and harms the poor. It is inadequate to combat 
crime and exploitation. The practice of democracy in Gotham is insufficient to produce the types 
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of subjects (and leaders) that it takes to maintain democracy, so Bruce must seize authority for 
himself. 
DEMOCRACY’S DARK NIGHT IN THE DARK KNIGHT 
This theme runs throughout the three films. Can a system of government where the power 
to rule is ostensibly vested in the people succeed, or will it necessarily devolve into anarchy? 
Along with this question necessarily arises DiPaolo’s question of civil rights. In The Dark 
Knight, Ra’s al Ghul’s ideologically motivated fanaticism is replaced by the Joker’s love of 
chaos. The Joker appears after organized crime has been pressed nearly to the breaking point, at 
which time he offers to eliminate the Batman for the remaining crime bosses — for a fee, of 
course. He describes himself as a “dog chasing cars” and tells others that his goal is simply to 
bring chaos into places where order prevails.18 The Joker commits act of wanton terror 
throughout the city, including killing Wayne’s love interest, Rachel Dawes, and burning off half 
of the face of her fiancée, District Attorney Harvey Dent. His aim is to destroy Batman’s moral 
authority rather than killing him.19 The structure of the plot at its most basic is very simple: the 
Joker is perpetrating acts of evil, and someone (Batman) must stop him. 
The film does delve into important issues of the legitimacy of emergency powers, 
vigilante justice, and sovereign action. The film signals this early on when Bruce shows up (with 
a supermodel date in tow) at the restaurant where Harvey Dent and Rachel Dawes20 are eating. 
The conversation turns to whether Batman is a force for good or a force for evil. Harvey defends 
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him; when Bruce asks, “Who appointed the Batman?”, Harvey replies, “We did. All of us who 
stood by and let scum take control of our city.”21 The conversation continues: 
NATASCHA [Bruce’s supermodel date]: But this is a democracy, Harvey. 
 
DENT: When their enemies were at the gates, the Romans would suspend democracy and 
appoint one man to protect the city. It wasn’t considered an honor. It was considered a 
public service. 
 
RACHEL: Harvey, the last man that they appointed to protect the republic was named 
Caesar, and he never gave up his power. 
 
DENT: Okay, fine. You either die a hero, or you live long enough to see yourself become 
the villain.22 
 
The film explicitly addresses the legitimacy of a single individual seizing the authority 
that ought to be left to the masses. When asked who appointed Batman — a term that implies 
administrative decision making, whereas a term such as elected might imply democratic 
relationships — Harvey makes the grant of authority implicit. Batman may be outside (above) 
the law, but he acts functionally as a sovereign, and in some sense he is more legitimate than 
those who were actually elected. Gotham’s preservation rests solely in his hands. Because the 
subjects of democracy could not combat threats to the foundation of the city on their own, a self-
chosen leader was necessary to preserve their way of life. Sovereign authority is an obligation 
not lightly undertaken; it must at times replace democracy if danger is too near. Harvey equates 
the prevalence of crime with the imminent danger of one’s enemies being “at the gate,” thereby 
expanding the “emergency” of exigent circumstances to instances of “everyday” lawless action, 
ignoring that the methods used by Batman to combat crime are as extralegal as the actions of 
criminals (not to mention the disparate militarization in terms of weapons technology as Batman 
and the Joker are both much better equipped than the average criminal). Good and bad become 
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categories outside of democratically determined structures, to be determined by Batman instead 
of by the people, and illegality can only be combatted by equally extreme means. Legality is 
teleologically suspended for the higher good of the preservation of life. 
The “necessity” of extreme, extralegal action is demonstrated concretely throughout 
Batman’s attempts to combat the Joker. In order to find where the Joker is so as to stop his reign 
of chaos, Batman turns every cell phone in the city into a sonar device, effectively allowing him 
to surveil the entire city at once. The only way to stop an enemy who may strike anyone 
anywhere at any time, an enemy with “no obvious limits,” as Wolin puts it, is to surveil everyone 
everywhere all the time.23 While Batman destroys the device as soon as the Joker is captured, it 
does not diminish the film’s implication that he was justified in using it prior to neutralizing the 
threat to Gotham. DiPaolo writes, “The implication of this decision [to destroy the device] is 
that, ultimately, the Joker fails to push Batman into becoming a full-fledged, permanent fascist or 
a technocrat. He just pushes Batman into briefly becoming a tyrant.”24 The only way to save 
democracy is to seize authority from the people for use by a single individual. 
However, the film’s antipathy toward popular sovereignty is not expressed only by what 
Batman does; it is also demonstrated through the film’s silences. The majority of the film does 
not display the “usual” citizens of Gotham. It seems to be a city made up only of police, 
criminals, public officials, and rich political donors. The “people” are only present in two related 
scenes. Toward the end of the film, the Joker threatens to blow up a hospital unless an individual 
trying to reveal Batman’s alter ego is killed, a serious attempt by the Joker to embroil Gotham in 
a Hobbesian war of all against all (or at least all against one). The hospital is evacuated, and for 
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the first time in the film, the “people” are present, but they are little more than passive victims of 
violence. This image is further secured when one of the buses goes missing and its passengers 
are taken as hostages by the Joker and his minions. The people are helpless to fend for 
themselves, and it is only by Batman saving them from the ruthless criminals that they are able to 
survive. 
EQUALITY DOWN THE RIVER? GOTHAM’S PRISONER DILEMMA 
The second scene that portrays the people occurs shortly after the hospital scene. Citizens 
from Gotham are being transported off of the island in boats. The first two ferries to leave cause 
controversy: one is full of citizens, but the other is full of criminals who are being sent off of the 
island in case the Joker would want to use them in his plans. While still in the water, the engines 
of both boats stall, and the Joker’s voice is broadcast over the intercom. He reveals to the 
passengers of both ships that he has wired the boats’ engines with explosives and given each boat 
the other boat’s detonator. One boat must choose to blow up the other boat prior to midnight or 
else the Joker will incinerate them both. 
On the boat full of citizens, the matter is put to a vote. The matter is to be determined 
democratically. Surely, it seems, the citizens will not vote to destroy a boatful of people merely 
to save themselves, even if those they would be killing are criminals. The citizens are composed 
of (seemingly respectable); there are businessmen, mothers with children, members of the 
military, and others just seeking to leave the island. Will they really choose to destroy a boat full 
of other humans? The viewer knows that this would only reinforce the Joker’s position; to blow 
up the boat is to allow the Joker’s regime of fear to triumph. When the vote comes back, though, 
the democratically produced answer is decidedly in favor of blowing up the boat full of criminals 
by a count of 340-196. It seems to the viewer that democracy has failed to produce the correct 
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answer. The procedure has certainly been democratic, but this does nothing to assure the viewer 
that the citizens made the proper choice.  
Further, while the answer is democratically produced in terms of the procedures used in 
the particular instance, the democratic situation itself is produced by emergency. The system by 
which some are chosen to live and some are chosen to die in the particular case of the boats 
exempts itself from the typical standards used by a democracy to determine punishment; it 
ignores both the type of and intent behind the offenses committed.25 While the criminals on the 
boat are from a prison designed to hold more “dangerous” prisoners, the decision to blow up the 
boat reflects little more than the position of the citizens on the boat: a position of peril. The 
discussion does not incorporate broader principles of fairness or just retribution that are ideally 
included in conversations concerning how the law ought to be applied. Instead, the question is no 
more than “Us or them?” One member on the boat even says, “We don’t all have to die. Those 
men had their chance.”26 Democracy is often thought to be more than a formal system of 
governance, i.e., rule by the people, and also to include features such as equality, justice, and rule 
of law. (Thus exists the classical typology of governments, which includes both anarchy and 
democracy as structurally identical but functionally different.27) However, Gotham’s democracy 
apparently does not hold to these principles. Instead of considering the common good of their 
society more broadly, the citizens cast aside their principles at the soonest sign that they might be 
subjected to some type of harm. The film seems to pose the question, “Is democracy always only 
a situation of us or them?” Democracy is reduced to base self-interest (if it were not always that). 
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However, this way of casting the situation on the boat ignores that all decisions made by 
a democracy have a relationship to emergency. The emergency may not always be an immediate 
threat to the actual existence of the democracy or of its citizens, but any change made to a 
democracy threatens to alter it in a way that fundamentally shifts its current makeup. In other 
words, to change the laws of a society (or, for that matter, to have a society at all, which 
necessarily entails plurality and thereby intersubjectivity) is to risk having it appear as something 
different than it had previously been. The “norms” to which democracy subscribes are always 
contestable and positional. The point, then, is not so much that democratic “norms” in an abstract 
sense fail but that the movie itself makes it seem as if the people on the boat have done the 
wrong thing in voting against the prisoners. 
This feeling that those on the boat made the wrong decision is further reinforced by what 
can be thought of as the second “failure” of the scene. Even after arriving at the decision to blow 
up the other boat, the citizens cannot find someone willing to abide by the decision. No one on 
the boat is willing to pull the trigger. One man tries. He states, “No one wants to get their hands 
dirty. Fine. I’ll do it. Those men on that boat, they made their choices. They chose to murder and 
steal. It doesn’t make any sense for us to have to die too.”28 But when he holds the detonator in 
his hands, he is unable to do the deed. He cannot save the people of democracy. His inability to 
act demonstrates that some reservation still exists about taking action against society’s outcasts. 
This, though, problematizes the vote’s implication that democracy is just mass rule and self-
interest. Is it something more? And is that “something more” good for democracy if it cannot 
produce citizens willing to dirty their hands for the sake of democracy? 
Again, with this portion of the scene, the point is not that there has been an actual 
“failure” of democracy to produce some sort of paradigm of citizens. Rather, the film seems to 
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leave two options: democracy is capable of producing only either citizens who pay lip service to 
principles of fairness and justice, or it produces citizens who adhere to the principles to the 
detriment of the democracy, even up to its death. If citizens want to survive, they must betray the 
principles that make democracy worth having. Democracy cannot both produce subjects who are 
rooted in democracy and who can take the necessary steps to save the people. 
While the citizenry might fail to act in accordance with the expectations of idealized 
democratic principles when they vote to kill the boat of prisoners, they do not fail to act in 
accordance with the norms of the regime that dominates Gotham, a regime that is itself not in 
accordance with idealized democratic principles. By this I mean that the citizens on the boat 
choose to reduplicate a decision that the elites of Gotham had made a long time prior: they treat 
the prisoners on the boat as a category of life that is disposable in order that their lives may be 
made central and protected. The “criminals” on the boat are not lives of the same type as those 
who are members of the “citizen” class. As Judith Butler writes, “The epistemological capacity 
to apprehend a life is partially dependent on that life being produced according to norms that 
qualify it as a life or, indeed, as part of life.”29 The criminals have not been produced according 
to Gotham’s norms. Gotham values the “productive” members of society, the elites who are 
capable of judging according to norms that prioritize the cost-benefit analysis and cold 
rationality of neoliberalism. It values citizens like the businessman. The businessman reduces the 
decision of the boat to “us or them.” He assumes that one boat will make the decision to destroy 
the other, so direct and immediate action is required to ensure that it is his boat that makes the 
decision and not the boat of the criminals. The criminals are nonproductive, so they should be 
destroyed if productive members of society are put in risk. It is unsurprisingly the businessman 
who makes use of this rationality. While it is true that the boat of citizens may have made the 
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same decision if the other boat had been filled with other citizens like them instead of with 
criminals, the majority of the justifications that are used by the citizens do not explicitly entail 
their own predicament but instead the nature of those whom they will be eliminating. Part of the 
argument is that at least one group (if not both) will be destroyed either way, but the citizens 
seem to think that it should be the “valuable” group that remains. 
When a member of the criminal boat throws the detonator for the other boat out of the 
window, he is to some extent mirroring the vote of the citizens to destroy the boat of criminals. 
He actively attempts to ensure that his life and the lives of all the other individuals on the 
prisoner are treated as disposable. This is clear when he says to the guard holding the detonator, 
“You don’t want to die, but you don’t know how to take a life. Give it to me. These men will kill 
you and take it anyway. Give it to me. You can tell them I took it by force. Give it to me, and I’ll 
do what you should have done ten minutes ago.”30 The “criminal” — a member of a disposable 
category of life — takes the detonator from the citizen holding it — a member of a category of 
“valuable” life — based on the argument that he is capable of acting against valuable life in a 
way that a member of the same category cannot. It is because the criminal is not worthy of life 
that he is deemed capable to take life, but his decision not to do so merely replicates the view of 
his category of life as disposable that the businessman and other civilians hold. 
Ironically, the situation of precariousness in which both ships find themselves causes to 
some degree the citizen boat to recognize the members of the criminal boat as living beings. As 
the passengers of the civilian boat are calling out for the destruction of the criminal boat, the 
captain points out, “Don’t forget. We’re still here. Which means they haven’t killed us yet 
either.”31 The criminals began as essentially non-human creatures, vicious savages incapable of 
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organized society. Meanwhile, the civilians are practical. They are voters. If a majority of them 
agree on something, then that decision makes sense. But when the captain points out that the 
other boat has not yet destroyed them, he re-humanizes the criminals. They are not the beast who 
would destroy the other boat without even discussing whether or not it was the right option; they 
too have a sense of something more than mere self-preservation keeping them from pulling the 
trigger. The reanimation of inert bodies via the shifting of the epistemological framework 
through which the criminals are seen is all that keeps the businessman from killing them. Perhaps 
they are forms of life worth valuing, not merely disposable bodies? 
What, though, is the aim of the Joker in putting the two boats in such a position? Batman 
asks him this question, suggesting that his point was to show that “deep down, everyone’s as 
ugly as you?”32 On this reading the Joker is seeking to collapse the distance between himself and 
the two groups, which will also necessarily entail collapsing the distance between the two groups 
as well. The Joker, though, refuses to answer. On some level, Batman’s suggestion seems to get 
at the truth. The Joker has consistently tried to antagonize Batman so that Batman will be willing 
to kill him; such a decision would effectively be a victory on the part of the Joker. Likewise, the 
Joker says that he has taken Harvey Dent and “brought him down to our level [referring to him 
and Batman].”33 These statements would seem to indicate that the Joker views the world as a 
place of good/evil, rationality/madness dichotomies, and he tries to promote the subordinate 
aspects of the binaries.34 
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THE JOKER AND SCHEMING 
However, not all of Joker’s actions or aims seem to fit within a simple good/evil 
dichotomy (or at least cannot simply be explained in such terms). Why, for example, does the 
Joker specifically choose to blow up a hospital? Why not the mayor’s office? He does blow up 
part of a police station but in a far less dramatic fashion. What is the point of choosing the 
hospital? The hospital is central to the life of the city and the state. It contains family members of 
many citizens. Selecting the hospital and requiring the passengers on two ships to blow each 
other up result from the same origin: recognition on the Joker’s part of the function of the state in 
biopolitical regimes35 as the preserver of life and a recognition that state legitimacy is measured 
in terms of whether it is fulfilling this task. Roberto Esposito articulates the continued relevance 
of biopolitics in the following terms: “It is not difficult to recognize its growing presence in all 
areas of domestic and international politics, along a line of growing indistinction between public 
and private. From the health sector to that of biotechnology, from ethnic issues to the 
environment, the only source of political legitimacy today seems to be the preservation and 
implementation of life.”36 I think that the Joker is positioned to recognize this when he selects a 
hospital as his target and when he puts the lives of large numbers of civilians and criminals (both 
groups of citizens) in danger. He is exploiting the state’s concern with ordered life to generate 
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chaos. Like the Batman, the Joker is also undermining state sovereignty, albeit apparently more 
intentionally. For the Joker, the reasoning is not presented directly in these terms, but this 
reasoning is implicit in the arguments that he does make. The Joker promises to blow up a 
hospital unless someone kills a man who has threatened to reveal Batman’s true identity as Bruce 
Wayne. By threatening a hospital he effectively turns the city against this individual. The 
hospital is a central feature of Gotham, so targeting it affects the entire city.  
The Joker meets Harvey Dent in his hospital room shortly before destroying the hospital, 
and he makes an interesting set of statements. Harvey blames the Joker for Rachel’s death, 
stating that it was the Joker’s plan, so he is to blame. The Joker responds, “Do I really look like a 
guy with a plan? You know what I am? I’m a dog chasing cars. I wouldn’t know what to do with 
one if I caught it. You know? I just do things. The mob has plans. The cops have plans. Gordon’s 
got plans. … I’m not a schemer. I try to show the schemers how pathetic their attempts to control 
things really are.”37 At first the Joker seems to be saying that he never makes plans for the 
actions that he undertakes, which is problematic because many of his schemes require a good 
deal of forethought and careful instrumentation. But the Joker is not, in my view, talking about 
individual plans (e.g. I’m going to put explosives on two boats so that I can make the passengers 
on the boats argue about blowing each other up). He is talking about teleologies and 
epistemological frameworks. What I mean by teleologies seems fairly straightforward: no meta-
plan guides his actions as he carries out his specific acts of destruction. The idea of 
epistemological frameworks, on the other hand, is a bit more complicated, for which reason I 
will turn again to Butler. 
Butler argues that the frameworks by which we view life as existing within themselves 
contain the elements of their own undoing. She writes, “The frame that seeks to contain, convey, 
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and determine what is seen (and sometimes, for a stretch, succeeds in doing precisely that) 
depends upon the conditions of reproducibility in order to succeed,”38 but she notes that the need 
for reproducibility in promoting the frame removes the frame from its original context in a way 
that undermines the production of a frame itself. It is still necessary to have epistemological (in 
the sense that they mediate our ability to understand certain lives as existing) frames — even if 
they are contestable and superseded with regularity — in order to translate the world we inhabit. 
The Joker, on the other hand, appears to be contesting the very necessity of interpretive 
epistemological frameworks. He “just do[es]” things, but he also does them in a way that 
contests the production of schemes, a word that doubly refers to structures, such as those of 
thought and power, and to plans, both long-term and short-term. The Joker’s escapades seem 
then to be a fight against the production of meta-narratives or epistemological frames that would 
give any sort of meaning to his actions. The Joker cannot respond to Batman’s desire for a “why” 
because the very presence of a “why” goes against what the Joker is doing.39 
The end of the second movie can in some ways be seen as a defeat of the Joker’s anti-
schemes. Harvey is still seen as good even though Batman is made to be evil. The Joker says that 
the citizens’ “spirit [will] brea[k] completely” when they “get a good look at the real Harvey 
Dent and all the ‘heroic things’ he’s done”40 but this does not happen. Instead of the film ending 
with Harvey’s exposure, a regime based on lies is established. Batman takes the fall for what 
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Harvey did, and the government passes harsh criminal reform laws that memorialize Harvey and 
punish criminals in his name. The Joker appears to have failed. 
THE DARK KNIGHT RISES AND POLITICAL MYTHMAKING  
The ending sets the stage for the beginning of the third movie, which takes place eight 
years after the second. Gotham City has been cleaned up of crime thanks in large part to the Dent 
Act. While the Act is never described in specific terms, the film makes it clear that it led to an 
increase in the ability of law enforcement to use force against criminals. In a speech given on 
Harvey Dent Day, a day reserved for honoring Harvey and which the mayor describes as “one of 
the most important [holidays]” that Gotham has,41 the mayor explains that Harvey’s death 
provided the impetus for the Dent Act, which “gave law enforcement teeth in its fight against the 
mob.”42 Commissioner Gordon likewise states that “there are one thousand inmates in Blackgate 
Prison as a direct result of the Dent Act. These are violent criminals, essential cogs in the 
organized crime machine.”43 Gordon finishes the speech by stating that Dent’s death “has not 
been for nothing.”44  
The current safety and security of the people of Gotham is based entirely on a mythology 
created around the actions of a “hero” turned homicidal, yet the sense of security itself is a type 
of mythology. The mayor notes in his speech that the city still has crime but that it is not 
“organized” crime. The criminals are “violent,” while Harvey Dent was a “hero” and a “knight,” 
someone capable of being an inspiration to the city. As Gordon says, “I believed in Harvey 
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Dent.”45 The contestable assertion of the presence of a utopic peace existing in Gotham is 
predicated on the ideal of Harvey Dent, Gotham’s “White Knight.” 
For Gotham to achieve peace, a mythology springs up around the tragedy of Harvey 
Dent’s death, and this mythology is used as a reference point that justifies all later actions taken 
to prevent the same harm from occurring again. Wolin addresses the manufacture of myths in the 
context of 9/11 in similar terms. He writes,  
[September 11] was converted into the political equivalent of a holy day of crucifixion, of 
martyrdom, that fulfilled multiple functions: as the basis of a political theology, as a 
communion around a mystical body of a bellicose republic, as a warning against political 
apostasy, as a sanctification of the nation’s leader, transforming him from a powerful 
officeholder of questionable legitimacy into an instrument of redemption, and at the same 
time exhorting the congregants to a wartime militancy, demanding of them uncritical 
loyalty and support, summoning them as participants in a sacrament of unity and in a 
crusade to ‘rid the world of evil.’ … Myth recounts a story, in this case of how the armies 
of light will arise from the ruins to battle and overcome the forces of darkness. Myth 
presents a narrative of exploits, not an argument or a demonstration. It does not make the 
world intelligible, only dramatic. In the course of its account the actions of the myth’s 
heroes, no matter how bloody or destructive, acquire justification. They become 
privileged, entitled to take actions that are morally denied to others. No need to tally the 
Iraqi civilian casualties.46 
 
For Wolin, the “holy day” (or “holiday”) of September 11 becomes the basis of a political 
theology that prioritizes the “mystical body” of the state over the bodies of Iraqi civilians. Wolin 
does not quite put it in these terms, but it seems to follow from his argument that there is a direct 
linkage between the sanctifying power of a political hol(y)day and the legitimation of action 
taken against some bodies by others. The justification of “heroic” actions is the necessary effect 
of the establishment of such a day, and it proceeds necessarily from the establishment of a 
transcendent “body politic” that is staticized in its relations and eternal in form. The same thing 
occurs via Harvey Dent Day; the event of Harvey’s death, allegedly at the hands of Batman, 
justifies granting greater authority to the police. 
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Butler further develops the relationship between the generation of a sovereign nation-
state and the production of subjects. Butler’s argument is complex, and her main point is not, I 
think, primarily aimed at the relationships of states to subjects, but she does deal with the issue in 
the course of her discussion of the way that affect is produced and regulated with respect to both 
grievable and disposable populations. Butler notes that war “seeks to deny the ongoing and 
irrefutable ways in which we are all subject to one another, vulnerable to destruction by the 
other, and in need of protection through multilateral and global agreements based on the 
recognition of a shared precariousness.”47 This denial is based, argues Butler, on efforts to 
minimize precariousness for some by maximizing it for others, but doing so fails to recognize 
that individuals can never exist individually, that “our very survival depends not on the policing 
of a boundary — the strategy of a certain sovereign in relation to its territory — but on 
recognizing how we are bound up with others, [which] leads us to reconsider the way in which 
we conceptualize the body in the field of politics.”48  
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The borders of sovereign states are intertwined with perceptions of the body’s social 
dependency. Butler writes, “After 9/11 we saw the development of the perspective according to 
which the ‘permeability of the border’ represents a national threat, or indeed a threat to identity 
itself. … [O]ne fears invasion, encroachment, and impingement, and makes a territorial claim in 
the name of self-defense.”49 Further, “The notion of the subject produced by the recent wars 
conducted by the U.S., including its torture operations, is one in which the U.S. subject seeks to 
produce itself as impermeable, to define itself as protected permanently against incursion and as 
radically invulnerable to attack.”50 For Butler, the subject produced by the reification and 
transcendentalizing of the state as an eternal and “mystical” body likewise produces subjects of 
such a body who view themselves as equally impermeable and who desire security at any price. 
As the United States must survive by maximizing its position of security and diminishing the 
degree to which outside “threats” may be advanced against it, so the selves that compose the 
United States are produced as impermeable and righteous bodies.  
Butler continues, “How I am encountered, and how I am sustained, depends 
fundamentally on the social and political networks in which this body lives, how I am regarded 
and treated, and how that regard and treatment facilitates this life or fails to make it livable. … It 
follows, then, that certain kinds of bodies will appear more precariously than others, depending 
on which versions of the body, or of morphology in general, support or underwrite the idea of the 
human life that is worth protecting, sheltering, living, mourning. These normative frameworks 
establish in advance what life will become worthy of being mourned. Such views of lives 
pervade and implicitly justify contemporary war.”51 The subject of the United States is a subject 
that views itself as always at risk and aware of the risk that is presented to it by being a member 
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of the United States. This view of individual precariousness, perceived as the result of national 
precariousness, leads to attempted impermeability at both levels. But if subjects are 
impermeable, then there is no possibility for rethinking relationships of identity\difference. There 
are only subjects who must be protected (because their protection entails my protection) and 
subjects who must be disposed of or eradicated (because they present a threat to my 
permeability, if not my existence). Thus the production of a pseudo-spiritual mythology around 
September 11 justifies the actions of the “heroes” of the United States against Iraqis and 
Afghanis because those heroes are trusted to minimize precariousness for themselves and those 
who are like them. A shared recognition of norms of precariousness solidifies connections 
between members of the same class while the failure to recognize precariousness qua 
precariousness regulates affect in a way that deems some lives mournable and some disposable. 
This is precisely the way in which Harvey Dent Day and the mythology around Harvey 
Dent works for the upper-class residents of Gotham City. The holiday is a secular “holy day,” 
and it is based on the martyrdom of a hero of the “people,” where the people are understood as 
those who are like Harvey in the relevant aspects, which largely seem to be related to class (and 
potentially race). The death of Gotham’s “White Knight,” an Arthurian figure of veneration and 
honor, generates the production of a class of individuals who are viewed as terroristic in their 
activity and are thereby justly imprisoned. Not coincidentally do Gordon and the mayor speak 
directly after Bane and his men are shown hijacking an American plane, one of the men 
sacrificing himself to “star[t] the fire” of political change, the same change that causes Selina 
Kyle (Catwoman) to warn Bruce Wayne on numerous occasions that “there’s a storm coming.”52 
The unsteady peace relies on a frame of hyper-criminalization that perceives threats to the 
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systemic economic inequality of Gotham and the privilege of the upper class while missing 
threats that would affect the majority of Gotham’s citizens, including the non-wealthy. 
MORE LIFE AND MERE LIFE 
A major overtone of the movie is the inequality that exists within Gotham. As Travis 
Langley notes, “With the haves feeding off the have-nots during troubled post-9/11, post-war 
times and evil men then pounding their messages into frustrated citizens, Bruce needs to 
determine once and for all what kind of hero, what kind of legend or man, people really need and 
what they need to know about him.”53 Bruce is warned, as mentioned above, by Selina Kyle that 
Gotham cannot remain long in the state that it is. She says, “There's a storm coming, Mr. Wayne. 
You and your friends better batten down the hatches, ‘cause when it hits you're all gonna wonder 
how you ever thought you could live so large and leave so little for the rest of us.”54 Similarly, 
Officer Blake encourages Bruce to continue funding a home for orphans for which his charity 
had previously provided money while Alfred implores him to stop fighting crime and contribute 
to Gotham in other ways: 
ALFRED: That was then. And you can strap up your leg and put your mask back on. But 
that doesn’t make you what you were. 
 
WAYNE: If this man [Bane] is everything that you say he is, then this city needs me. 
 
ALFRED: This city needs Bruce Wayne. Your resources, your knowledge. It doesn’t need 
your body, or your life. That time has passed. 
 
WAYNE: You’re afraid that if I go back out there, I’ll fail. 
 
ALFRED: I’m afraid that you want to.55 
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Alfred appeals to Bruce based on the value of life, but not on life as an individuated occurrence. 
He is referring to what Bonnie Honig characterizes as “more life,” or “something like that 
overliving: it is a dividend — that surprise extra, the gift that exceeds rightful expectations, the 
surplus that exceeds casuality.”56 It is a vision of life that goes beyond the “mere life” of 
survival, rearticulating the idea of surviving as containing aspects of what we might presently 
consider luxurious but which actually contributes to a fuller existence. 
Honig contrasts more life with survival, stating, “Often survival’s needs reduce us, they 
make us focus on specifics, immediacies, the needs of mere life.”57 But Honig is not only 
concerned with a contrast between the two. Rather, she states that “Too many democratic 
theorists focus on either the heroic or the everyday, reinscribing rather than interrogating an 
opposition between the needs of mere life versus more life. But survival as mere and more life 
postulates both, acknowledging their agonistic tension and mutual indebtedness.” Essentially, 
she is seeking an understanding of survival that indicates both surviving and thriving, and she 
believes that this is essential for democratic politics. One of Honig’s most important examples of 
this comes in her discussion of food politics, during which she analyzes a movement called Slow 
Food’s argument for a “right to taste.” Slow Food focuses not just on having food (survival as 
mere life) but on having food that is produced responsibly and with a focus on quality (survival 
as “overlife”). She states, “Slow Food called people to resist the bland homogeneity of fast food 
on behalf of diversity in taste — local flavors, crops, and species,”58 which in turn itself entails 
“education, biodiversification, localism, and transnationalism. It also entails political action.”59 
In essence, the argument of a right to taste reformulates the categories of what is seen as 
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necessary and what is seen as excessive or beyond necessary with respect to democratic life. 
Thus, “In the context of survival as mere life, the right to taste does not stand out as a pressing 
concern; it seems like a luxury,” but Slow Food has “rescript[ed] that supposed luxury as a 
necessity for human health and wellbeing, and [oriented] our gaze toward a different emergency: 
the contemporary infrastructure of consumption.”60 Honig argues that this “remobilizes the 
doubleness of survivance — as both mere and more life.”61 Essentially, the idea is that the 
characterizations of necessity produced by situations of emergency are themselves contestable. 
Threats to human life do not only include those that deal with crises that could end existence (i.e. 
war); they are also those that have the potential to diminish substantially or radically alter 
existence as we know it. These sorts of crises may be combatted by sacrificing the 
overproduction and focus on quantity that is central to mere existence for the sake of a world that 
at times may seem “luxurious” but is in fact necessary for the preservation of humanity. 
In my view, Honig’s argument runs parallel to Butler’s in Frames of War. Therein, Butler 
critiques the idea of a right to life. In her argument, she notes that the debate that considers the 
concept of personhood as primary when considering a right to life “restricts itself to an ontology 
of individualism that fails to recognize that life, understood as precarious life, implies a social 
ontology which calls that form of individualism into question. There is no life without the 
conditions of life that variably sustain life, and those conditions are pervasively social, 
establishing not the discrete ontology of the person, but rather the interdependency of persons, 
involving reproducible and sustaining social relations, and relations to the environment and to 
non-human forms of life, broadly considered.”62 Butler contends that viewing a right to life in a 
social context, not as a right rooted in “ontogenetic” interpretations of the existence of rights, 
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“impl[ies] positive obligations to provide those basic supports that seek to minimize 
precariousness in egalitarian ways: food, shelter, work, medical care, education, rights of 
mobility and expression, protection against injury and oppression. Precariousness grounds such 
positive social obligations …”63 She continues, “Our obligations are precisely to the conditions 
that make life possible, not to ‘life itself,’ or rather, our obligations emerge from the insight that 
there can be no sustained life without those sustaining conditions, and that those conditions are 
both our political responsibility and the matter of our most vexed ethical decisions.” For Butler, 
as for Honig, there is an undeniable link between existence and the conditions that make 
existence itself livable. There is a link between “mere life” and “more life.” 
It is this link to which Alfred calls Bruce’s attention when he implores him to cease being 
Batman and to instead devote his intelligence and his wealth to changing Gotham for the better. 
Bruce as Batman understands only the emergency of immediate violence and destruction against 
the city. As in the case of al Ghul (and presumably Bane), Bruce sees as the primary threat to 
Gotham an evil that must be expunged from the city. It is a material evil; terrorists are coming 
who must be stopped. Bruce either refuses to or is incapable of seeing the underlying issues that 
bring Bane and the League of Shadows to Gotham. The motives are presented as merely 
revenge, but this ignores that Ra’s al Ghul’s original mission involved not simply revenge but 
punishment for the greed and corruption of the city. Instead of using his wealth to combat greed 
and corruption, Bruce instead falls directly into the trap of greed by prioritizing his own 
understanding of what Gotham — a city he has only experienced as an outsider of sorts — needs, 
not by listening to the calls of those such as Blake and Alfred, one of whom actively lives in the 
city and the other of whom seems to be more attentive to such concerns. 
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PERILOUS POPULISM 
The movie’s focus on inegalitarianism is manifested in other ways as well. For example, 
a recurrent theme is the likelihood of the multitude to resort to selfishness and greed when the 
structures of law and enforcement of the law are removed. As soon as Bane introduces martial 
law into the city, blowing up a football field and revealing a nuclear bomb underneath, 
essentially anarchy ensues, but only an anarchy of the poor. Bane tells the multitude that they are 
claiming “what is rightfully [theirs],”64 but the movie portrays the time as a reign of terror. Only 
the poor are safe because they have no wealth that can be taken. The rich are in danger because 
the poor have what they want. Bane tears down social structures to release the “greed” of the 
city. It is as if he recognizes the hypocrisy of destroying a city because of greed and corruption 
that exists only at the top and must instead expose its existence throughout the entirety of the 
system prior to destroying the city. The film thus seems to be promoting a redistribution of 
wealth more like that argued for by Andrew Carnegie than by Karl Marx. By this I mean that 
instead of a democratization of the forces of production, the film presents as dangerous a 
complete rule by the people. While it seems to recognize the problems of inequality, its solution 
seems to be one wherein the rich use their wealth on behalf of the people instead of letting the 
people control the resources (thus, Alfred consistently exhorts Bruce to devote his financial 
resources to the city). 
Bruce eventually comes around. He fakes his own death and leaves his mansion to the 
boys’ home that Officer Blake encouraged him to continue supporting. For Bruce to get to this 
point, though, his money must first be stolen by Bane so that another magnate, John Daggett, can 
take over the board at Wayne Enterprises. The wealthy are just as likely (if not more likely) to 
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keep what they have for themselves. But which is worse, the film seems to ask: leaving the 
wealth to the rabble or hoping that some tycoons will eventually recognize the ways in which 
they can do “good” with their resources? The answer the film gives seems decidedly in the 
second category, especially insofar as it seems to criticize movements such as Bane’s (read 
“populist movements”) as taking advantage of the general public in the same way that amassers 
of major sums of wealth do. Bane’s ostensibly egalitarian redistribution of wealth — which leads 
to kangaroo courts for the wealthy and supporters of the wealthy, such as police, as well as the 
looting of rich homes — is simply a mechanism by which he punishes/defeats Batman and 
destroys the city. The criticism, while it may be apt insofar as it contests current “representative” 
politics, is decidedly undemocratic in its portrayal of the masses. Perhaps something similar 
would happen if the same context were present in the real world. The important point is that the 
masses are constructed as unreasonable in opposition to Bruce’s perceived reasonableness. The 
few rich are wise; the many poor imbecilic and rapacious. 
GOTHAM AND MOVIEGOERS: THE PRODUCTION OF SUBJECTS 
This un- or anti-democratic sentiment runs throughout the Dark Knight Trilogy, 
prioritizing the actions of a single, wealthy individual in the face of chaos, terror, and emergency 
over the potential democratic actions of the general public. But the truly important question this 
film raises is what such a portrayal does to us as viewers. When we see the worst possible form 
of a world — the city, in Gotham’s case — what alterations does this produce in how we view 
the world? How does the portrayal of Batman regulate and produce frames and modes of affect 
that produce actions in the real world? Obviously, this question is impossible to answer to its 
fullest extent. To do so, one would need to be able to know and understand the way that the 
discourses that produce and are reproduced within the three films have produced and positioned 
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all groups and individuals who have viewed it while at the same time understanding the 
competing discourses outside of the world of the film that have also produced such subjects. In 
other — far more obvious — words, what the film does depends on the situation of the viewer. 
To contend otherwise would be to universalize the effects of a relative medium for relative 
viewers; only watching the movie behind a veil of ignorance would allow for such an 
interpretation. (Of course, being behind such a veil would make one wonder why they would 
watch it at all.) With this in mind, I would like to offer a few ideas about why the genre into 
which these films fall is popular as well as what points the films themselves seem to be making 
and how I think those points would tend to affect viewers. 
First, as has generally been noted throughout this chapter, though perhaps not in these 
specific terms, the superhero presents an extralegal outsider capable of preserving the law. Like 
the dictator elected by the Romans in times of trouble, the superhero has the capability to 
suspend democracy, to become essentially self-elected, in order to preserve the legal state of 
affairs. This is why Gordon is able to describe Batman as a friend who “plunge[d] their            
hands into the filth so that you can keep yours clean.”65 Superheroes try to save societies 
perceived to be “threatened,” and, more often than not, they succeed. 
However, this function also relates to other functions of the superhero film generally and 
of Batman specifically. Namely, the superhero generally makes implicit the ideal that violence is 
necessary to preserve an ordered society. It hearkens back to Thomas Jefferson’s quote, “The 
tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.”66 Of 
course, the implication of superhero movies is often that the tree of liberty must from time to 
time be refreshed with the blood of terrorists, even if doing so means temporarily abandoning 
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democracy for a system more closely resembling tyranny. The superhero is not merely an 
outsider who is capable of saving the law; the individual capable of saving the law is necessarily 
an extralegal outsider. Implicit in much of the superhero genre, especially that genre as 
exemplified in the Dark Knight Trilogy, is the idea that safety is the primary aim of any 
reasonable people and that such a safety can only be achieved by ceding power to an authority 
unchecked by juridical norms. Significantly, Batman’s only rule — that he not kill anyone — is 
self-imposed. Catwoman chooses not to follow it when she shoots and kills Bane, thereby saving 
Batman’s life. Even when the Joker tries to encourage Batman to kill him, Batman refuses. 
Otherwise, all legal norms go unheeded by Batman. This view of Batman as necessarily an 
outsider consequently implies and encourages a passive citizenry. He is the savior; society needs 
only to sit back and let him work. 
Further, though, beyond merely encouraging passivity of action, the superhero genre 
reinforces a conception of the state as security-focused. Even though by their very nature the 
characters of the superhero genre frequently act outside of the state,67 they present the most 
important concerns as concerns of security. Consequently, the films become part of a cultural 
regulation of affect in the fashion that Butler addresses. Superhero films are actively complicit in 
the production of a norm or an imaginary of subjects as beings that need protection from those 
contesting the legitimacy of the state/society (meant as a mutually constitutive and privileged 
binary), a protection that can only be received through violence undertaken by those brave 
enough to “get their hands dirty.” Thus, Gordon tells Blake that there may be a time “[w]hen the 
structures fail you. When the rules aren't weapons anymore, they're shackles, letting the bad guy 
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get ahead.”68 While the film ultimately contests the lie that emerged from the moment Gordon is 
referencing, it is not as quick to rethink whether someone who is willing to act outside of the 
provided structures is necessary to the preservation of those structures. 
▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
 
Superhero films allow individuals to see citizens like themselves saved from threats that 
may run parallel to those that they imagine as threatening themselves. But the continued need for 
films that function in this way is part of a need produced by the anxieties the films reinforce: 
anxieties about terrorism, about the need for the erosion of civil liberties in a post-9/11 world in 
order for safety to be maintained, about the permissiveness of use of force. Superhero films, 
especially Nolan’s Batman movies, are a result of this production of culture while also actively 
continuing to produce the culture that has made them; they result from fear resulting from 
antidemocratic forces and provide antidemocratic forces to the fears. We can see this more 
clearly when we turn to and examine the policies that have arisen after 9/11 with respect to 
executive authority and surveillance. 
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FROM PRISON TO PRISM: PANOPTICISM AND 
THE NSA 
Through the first two chapters, my aims have primarily been abstract. I would now like to 
turn to real-world practices that are related to the issues that I have been raising. The dystopic 
imaginaries and the elements of the utopic impulse that can be found within them matter because 
they assist in the construction of our understandings about what constitutes a legitimate social 
order. In the previous chapter, I examined some of the understandings that the Christopher Nolan 
Dark Knight Trilogy generates. Now I would like to discuss aspects of post-9/11 security policy 
that relate to how these films construct the world. Because of the wide variety of laws that are 
related to security, I will narrow my focus to the issue of surveillance. I will look first at some of 
the laws that were passed and practices that were adopted after and in relation to September 11, 
2001, in response to the potential threat of future terrorist attacks, as well as at the language that 
was used to discuss these problems. I would then like to consider the issue of surveillance in the 
abstract, drawing primarily on Foucault and his example of the panopticon. Finally, I would like 
to discuss the aspects of our thinking that might limit the possible futures that we can imagine 
and the role that the dystopic imagination plays in contesting the world as we take it to be. 
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THE PATRIOT ACT AND EXTENDED SURVEILLANCE 
In commencing this conversation, one of the most apparent or starting points is the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act (or, USA Patriot Act; hereafter “the Act”). The Act was passed by 
Congress on October 25, 2001, a mere month and one-half after September 11. It is lengthy and 
complex and authorizes a range of behaviors, including methods to curtail international money 
laundering, and surveillance techniques were significantly expanded through its passage. For 
example Title II of the Act, “Enhanced Surveillance Procedures,” granted authority to allow the 
“seizure of voice mail pursuant to a search warrant” as well as the ability to subpoena “the 
addresses and times of e-mail messages sent by terrorism suspects” without accessing the content 
of those messages and the ability to subpoena “records of electronic communications but not the 
content of those sessions.”1 Similarly, the law allows for “law enforcement officials to obtain … 
the authority for roving wiretaps on a person suspected of involvement in terrorism so that any 
telephone used by that person may be monitored.”2 While these changes did allow an entirely 
new range of activity to come under the purview of the government’s ability to conduct searches, 
they were defended by some, such as Laurence H. Tribe, as “entirely constitutional responses to 
technological change” concerning which we can be “reasonably confident the scales aren’t 
unfairly tipped against individual privacy.”3 The law also permits those whose computers have 
been hacked to allow law enforcement to “monitor attacks on their computer networks without 
needing a court order.”4 
                                                                 
     
1
 Amitai Etzioni and Jason H. Marsh, “Antiterrorism Tools: A Summary of the USA Patriot Act and the Order on 
Military Tribunals,” Rights vs. Public Safety after 9/11 , 19-20. 
     
2
 Ibid., 20. 
     
3
 Laurence H. Tribe, “We Can Strike A Balance on Civil Liberties,” Rights vs. Public Safety after 9/11 , Amitai 
Etzioni and Jason H. Marsh, eds., 17-18. 
     
4
 Etzioni and Marsh, “Antiterrorism Tools,” 19. 
F R O M  P R I S O N  T O  P R I S M | 77 
 
These provisions, though, were superseded in some respects by another portion of the 
Patriot Act that concerned National Security Letters. A National Security Letter (NSL) allows 
the FBI to obtain information including telephone and email records, financial records, and credit 
information.5 Congress has authorized the issuance of these letters without judicial oversight, and 
According to the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Section 505 of the Patriot Act 
lowered the standard according to which National Security Letters could be granted. The Act 
reads in relevant part, “information sought [must be] relevant to an authorized investigation to 
protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”6 According to the 
EPIC, this significantly lowered the burden that the government previously had to demonstrate in 
order to obtain such a letter. Before the Act, the “FBI may only have used NSLs to request 
information if it had ‘specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the customer or 
entity whose records are sought is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.’”7 Now, 
though, it is not a requirement that the information obtained be important to an ongoing 
investigation into terrorist activity. According to the ACLU, this lower standard allowed 
“hundreds of thousands of national security letters, a majority against U.S. persons, and many 
without any connection to terrorism at all.”8 The total number of NSLs issued expanded greatly 
after the Act was passed. The Washington Post reported in 2007 that there were fewer than 9,000 
NSL requests in 2000 but almost 50,000 in 2005.9 Further, EPIC notes that those who receive an 
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NSL are “prohibited, or ‘gagged,’ from telling anyone about their receipt of the NSL, which 
makes oversight difficult.”10 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND SECURITY MECHANISMS 
The FBI’s practice of issuing such letters was struck down by a U.S. District Judge in 
New York in 2007 on the grounds that it “violate[d] the First Amendment and constitutional 
provisions on the separation of powers because the FBI can impose indefinite gag orders on the 
companies, and the courts have little opportunity to review the letters.”11 However, this does not 
reach actual issues of security. As Laurence Tribe explains, though, the concern for laws like the 
Act extends beyond whether specific provisions are upheld or struck down: “[T]here is a danger, 
far from trivial, that the laws we enact today in response to yesterday’s terrorist attack will move 
the baseline of privacy expectations against which we assess the tools proposed to deal with 
tomorrow’s terrorist attack.”12 As Tribe points out in his essay, what constitutes the ideals of 
private and public under the United States Constitution are altered based on the standard of 
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” which was first articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
to the 1964 Supreme Court case of Katz v. United States.13 
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What this means is that the Fourth Amendment extends to non-physical locations so long 
as most people expect them to be private. However, this doctrine, which was revolutionary and 
expansive in its interpretation of the Constitution, implies in our modern era that Fourth 
Amendment protections only extend to those spaces where most people expect privacy (and, of 
course, to any sort of personal property that can be trespassed). As Tribe writes (summarizing the 
reasoning of the 2001 case Kyllo v. United States), the Court “cautioned that, once any 
technology is ‘in general public use,’ its employment by law enforcement agencies to pierce 
personal privacy might no longer count as a ‘search’ at all. In fact, the public’s tolerance for just 
a bit more government surveillance will grow as authority previously ceded sets an ever-moving 
precedent.”14 In other words, if the federal government enacts laws that push the limits of what is 
considered to be acceptable surveillance, this can alter the subjective expectations of citizens in a 
way that has constitutional ramifications with respect to what can be regarded an unlawful 
search. This is a potential weakness in the Katz standard, the two prongs of which consider both 
individual expectations of privacy and the expectations of society writ large. It is in part for this 
reason that some members of the Court have shifted to different understandings of the Fourth 
Amendment, which include not just the expectation of privacy in the area or object subject to 
search but also in the nature or duration of the search itself (see generally the various rationales 
given in the opinions of U.S. v. Jones, especially the concurrences by Justices Sonia Sotomayor, 
Samuel Alito15). 
DO WE HAVE A SAY ON THE NSA? 
Concerns about constant surveillance became even more pronounced in the wake of 
Edward Snowden’s revelation that the National Security Agency (NSA) regularly collects 
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metadata in bulk quantities. As The Guardian reported in June 2013, the NSA took advantage of 
provisions in the United States Patriot Act that allowed for the security agency to request that 
cell phone companies and other similar businesses turn over vast quantities of data. The 
Guardian released a court order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that 
commanded Verizon to “produce to the National Security Agency (NSA) upon service of this 
Order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this Order 
… an electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or ‘telephony 
metadata’ created by Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or 
(ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.”16 The order also specifies 
that the term “telephony metadata” refers to “comprehensive communications routing 
information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating and 
terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, 
International Mobile state Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone 
calling card numbers, and time and duration of call.”17 The order explicitly stated that neither the 
contents of the communications nor any information about calls that both started and ended in 
another country were being requested by the NSA. As The Guardian story that first exposed the 
surveillance noted, “A 2005 court ruling judged that cell site location data — the nearest cell 
tower a phone was connected to — was also transaction data, and so could potentially fall under 
the scope of the order.”18 
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The NSA was capable of collecting an open-ended amount of information about a 
majority of residents of the United States with the approval of a single court order. It was not 
merely Verizon that came under orders such as the one released by The Guardian. The 
Washington Post reported the day after The Guardian broke the story that “The National 
Security Agency and the FBI are tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S. 
Internet companies, extracting audio and video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and 
connection logs that enable analysts to track foreign targets …”19 This is done using a program 
known as PRISM, which, according to a leaked NSA PowerPoint presentation “enables 
‘collection directly from the servers’ of Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, and other online 
companies.”20 As The Guardian later reported, the collection of all of this data “allow[s] the 
NSA to build what it calls ‘a pattern of life,’ a detailed profile of a target and anyone associated 
with them.”21  
According to the same article, the NSA is allowed to analyze the metadata of a target and 
any who are up to “three hops” away from the target, meaning “people who talk to people who 
talk to people who talk to you.”22 Using a calculator on The Guardian’s website, someone who 
has 500 friends on Facebook would have approximately 13,349,780 people within this range. At 
the time of this writing, I have 1,011 “friends” on Facebook, which means there are 26,993,189 
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people within the analyzable distance of me, an amount between 8-9% of the U.S. population.23 I 
have no idea who the majority of these millions of people are, but this lack of knowledge in no 
way limits the NSA’s capacity to obtain information on my communication (and possibly even 
movement) patterns if they should deem such information useful to any sort of search. 
Perhaps one of the most frightening aspects of the Verizon court order was the mandate 
at the bottom of the first page: “Declassify on: 12 April 2038.”24 For 35 years (minus thirteen 
days), the NSA’s activities could have gone unknown by the public were it not for Edward 
Snowden’s disclosure of them. This problem is further compounded because the companies from 
whom the information was requested were themselves not permitted to share the fact that their 
data was being obtained by a security agency. Knowledge of the breadth of this mass web of 
complex surveillance relations, which only came about when they did because of the crisis of 
9/11, could have remained hidden from the public processes of democracy had someone not 
stepped forward. 
“THE HUGS I REMEMBER”: A REPUBLICAN’S RHETORIC ON NSA SURVEILLANCE 
It was not merely that these surveillance tactics originated because of 9/11, though. The 
continued defense and after-the-fact attempts to justify the program have similarly relied on the 
events of that date. The Guardian cites preventing another 9/11 as the NSA’s primary 
motivation.25 Recent Republican primary debates also indicate that some of the members of the 
party share this view. The matter came up during an extended discussion between Senator Rand 
Paul (R-KY) and Chris Christie, governor of New Jersey, during a primary in August 2015. The 
dialogue between Paul, Christie, and moderator Megyn Kelly occurred as follows: 
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KELLY: Alright, gentlemen, we're gonna switch topics now and talk a bit about terror and 
national security. Governor Christie. You've said that Senator Paul's opposition to the 
NSA's collection of phone records has made the United States weaker and more 
vulnerable, even going so far as to say that he should be called before Congress to 
answer for it if we should be hit by another terrorist attack. Do you really believe you 
can assign blame to Senator Paul just for opposing the bulk collection of people's phone 
records in the event of a terrorist attack? 
 
CHRISTIE: Yes, I do. And I'll tell you why: because I'm the only person on this stage 
who's actually filed applications under the Patriot Act, who has gone before the federal 
— the Foreign Intelligence Service court, who has prosecuted and investigated and 
jailed terrorists in this country after September 11th. … This is not theoretical to me. I 
went to the funerals. We lost friends of ours in the Trade Center that day. My own wife 
was two blocks from the Trade Center that day, at her office, having gone through it 
that morning. When you actually have to be responsible for doing this, you can do it, 
and we did it, for seven years in my office, respecting civil liberties and protecting the 
homeland. And I will make no apologies, ever, for protecting the lives and the safety of 
the American people. We have to give more tools to our folks to be able to do that, not 
fewer, and then trust those people and oversee them to do it the right way. As president, 
that is exactly what I'll do.26 
 
In response, Rand Paul suggested that searches should only take place pursuant to 
warrants issued with specific targets and potential threats as the object of the warrant. Christie 
rejected this notion, telling Paul that he could “blo[w] hot air about this” while “sitting in a 
subcommittee,” but for Christie, “protecting the lives of the American people” is paramount. 
Paul answered, “I don't trust President Obama with our records. I know you gave him a big hug, 
and if you want to give him a big hug again, go right ahead.” Christie fired back, 
And you know — you know, Senator Paul? Senator Paul, you know, the hugs that I 
remember are the hugs that I gave to the families who lost their people on September 
11th. Those are the hugs I remember, and those had nothing to do — and those had 
nothing to do with politics, unlike what you're doing by cutting speeches on the floor of 
the Senate, then putting them on the Internet within half an hour to raise money for your 
campaign and while still putting our country at risk.27 
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The rhetoric almost bleeds through the page. The only hugs Christie remembers are the 
ones from those who lost their family members on 9/11. But whatever the political strategy that 
may have been related to these measures, the important point is that talking about security in the 
way that Christie does dichotomizes our potential approaches to it: we are either surveilled and 
safe or exposed and precarious. Our “freedom” from the government’s gaze comes at no less a 
cost than our very existence. While some listening certainly agreed with Paul’s assertions, it is 
also certain, not the least from the applause that Christie received for his statements, that there 
was also considerable support for the latter’s views. 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH AND PANOPTICISM 
Surveillance is just one of the numerous tactics that have been employed since 9/11 to 
securitize and “make safe” the United States. We could also talk about no-fly lists, the denial of 
habeas corpus to some government detainees, or the use of torture procedure on U.S.-controlled 
land outside of the United States.28 Surveillance, though, is and has been essential to state control 
for centuries. To consider surveillance in the United States as it currently exists, I think it is 
helpful to turn to Foucault’s discussion of panopticism in his work Discipline and Punish. 
Foucault undertakes a lengthy discussion and analysis of the panopticon, a structure proposed by 
Jeremy Bentham as a way of disciplining a variety of potential subjects — schoolchildren, 
criminals, and the sick, for example — wherein the state is able both to control subjects and 
experiment on them. The structure would have a tower in the middle of a ring of cells that could 
be viewed from the interior; a single individual watching from the tower would be able to view 
each individual housed in the panopticon. As such, each person housed in the panopticon must 
always act as if they are being watched, even if no one is actually surveilling them. As Foucault 
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writes, it is “at once too much and too little that the prisoner [or civilian] should be constantly 
observed by an inspector: too little, for what matters is that he knows himself to be observed; too 
much, because he has no need in fact of being so.”29 
While the exact device of the panopticon was never itself employed, it provides a model 
for understanding how power must be situated if it is to produce the desired effects in those 
whom it regulates. The panopticon is a sort of ideal form of exercising disciplinary power, but 
lesser iterations of it can be seen everywhere, from the organization of a classroom so that the 
teacher can see everyone while each student can only see a few persons to the requirement some 
colleges have that students must sign in to every building they enter. Studying the panopticon 
allows us better to understand how power operates in the day-to-day. 
For Foucault, the techniques employed in the panoptic model themselves originated 
during the time of the plague in medieval Europe. Populations had to be controlled at the level of 
the individual. While the plague was the “ideal situation” for imagining disciplinary mechanisms 
(Foucault describes it as a “state of nature” for those who wanted to consider a disciplinary 
model of society), the techniques themselves spread outward throughout society. The incessant 
monitoring of many by a few in order to control the actions of the many on a consistent basis has 
become integral to the way power operates. Foucault states that the “panoptic arrangement … 
programmes, at the level of an elementary and easily transferable mechanism, the basic 
functioning of a society penetrated through and through with disciplinary mechanisms.”30 The 
aim of the panopticon is to create a governable and controllable social order. 
Foucault ties the implementation of the panopticon to the similar extension of “more 
profound processes,” which he seems to consider less visible. These processes are the 
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“functional inversion of the disciplines,” the “swarming of the disciplinary mechanisms,” and the 
“state-control of the mechanisms of discipline.”31 By the first process, the inversion of the 
disciplines, Foucault is referring to the ways in which the “disciplines function increasingly for 
making useful individuals.”32 This is opposed to a view of the disciplines as negative in the sense 
that they were “expected to neutralize dangers, to fix useless or disturbed populations, to avoid 
the inconveniences of over-large assemblies.”33 Foucault emphasizing a shift from the role of 
power as simply negative (i.e. it denies people) to power as positive (i.e. it produces identities). 
The second extension, the “swarming of disciplinary mechanisms,” means the 
“mechanisms [of disciplinary power] have a certain tendency to become ‘de-institutionalized,’ to 
emerge from the closed fortresses in which they once functioned and to circulate in a ‘free’ 
state.”34 Foucault is referring primarily to mechanisms of “civil society” that also serve to 
produce subjects in a certain way. He provides as an example the provision of charitable goods 
by the Church to those in need only after the family in question agreed to abide by a certain set 
of practices. The means and mechanisms of power thus were not necessarily aimed at producing 
the same subject in all times and places. Rather, the subject produced varied with the aims of 
those who employed the disciplinary mechanisms relevant to their aims. 
Finally, the third extension of disciplinary mechanisms came in the form of state control 
over such mechanisms. Foucault discusses in this section the “organization of a centralized 
police.”35 He states that the police force “is an apparatus that must be coextensive with the entire 
social body and not only by the extreme limits that it embraces, but by the minuteness of the 
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details that it is concerned with.”36 The creation of the police force allowed surveillance (and 
thus potential enforcement) to be spread throughout the entirety of the society, down to the 
minutest detail. Foucault writes that police power required the “instrument of permanent, 
exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as long as it could itself 
remain invisible.”37 The threat of policing must always be present, whether in the form of an 
informer, a secret agent, or an official officer, so that nothing can be thought hidden. If an aspect 
of the subject is removed from surveillance, then the possibility of producing the right type of 
subject is hampered. Subjects are produced by surveillance and by the conditioning of the receipt 
of benefits based upon particular behaviors. This in turn leads the subjects to internalize the 
forces that are acting upon them, causing them to act as both the subjects and objects of 
disciplinary power. It might not be the case that someone is always watching, but it is also 
always the case that someone might be watching. 
FOUCAULT AND GOVERNMENTALITY 
On the one hand, determining what types of subjects are created through the employment 
of these techniques seems simple: subjects who rely on the government for their protection and 
who are thus likely to be more inclined to trust the government on issues of security and foreign 
policy are produced by tactics that encourage individuals to provide all of their information to 
the government. If the government knows everything, then it lays claim to trustworthy judgment. 
That is, for the government to be able to “protect” society, it claims that it needs essentially 
unlimited access to the private information of ordinary citizens, and if these ordinary citizens 
think that their safety is dependent on the government having access to all of this information, 
                                                                 
     
36
 Ibid. It is worth noting that “police” does not refer to a system of police officers such as we have today but 
rather a whole collective of civil servants and workers to whom was ensured the responsibility of making certain 
that the law was followed and that disciplinary power was exercised. 
     
37
 Ibid., 214. 
88 | T H E  S O M E W H E R E  W E  W I S H  W E R E  N O W H E R E  
 
then they are likely going to provide it to the government. At the same time, though, we must 
understand not just the role that surveillance specifically plays in producing citizens but the role 
that surveillance plays in an overall scheme of management. For this we need to turn to the 
Foucauldian concept of “governmentality.” 
Foucault frequently uses the term “government” in a way that applies to more than the 
organization of state apparatuses. He writes, “Government is defined as a right manner of 
disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common good, as the jurists’ texts would 
have said, but to an end that is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that are to be governed. This 
implies a plurality of specific aims: for instance, government will have to ensure that the greatest 
possible quantity of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of 
subsistence, that the population is enabled to multiply, and so on.”38 For the art of government to 
be employed, it is required that those governing (including the state) will need to “exercis[e] 
toward its inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and all, a form of surveillance and 
control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods.”39 Thus for 
Foucault, the implementation of a policing force designed to manage and “discipline” the 
entirety of society is related to the ability to “govern” properly, that is, to organize and “dispose” 
of things in a way that is “convenient” to the object in question. 
The surveillance techniques that the NSA and other branches of the federal government 
employ can be understood similarly in the present day. These groups employ “machinery that 
assures dissymmetry, disequilibrium, difference.”40  There is always the chance that they are 
watching. When such a system is in place, Foucault notes, it “does not matter who exercises 
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power. Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine: in the absence of the 
director, his family, his friends, his visitors, even his servants. … The Panopticon is a marvelous 
machine which, whatever use one may wish to put it to, produces homogenous effects of 
power.”41 To surveil, to obtain cell phone location data, to review whom one has called, to 
examine the contacts one has made in order to establish a “way of life” profile, and to be able to 
do this to anyone even remotely related to someone who might be considered a target — all of 
this permits a dissymmetry of power equivalent to the model of the panopticon. As The 
Guardian summed up the NSA’s reasoning, one must be able to access the entire haystack if one 
hopes to find the needle in it.42 
SELF-MONITORING AND SECURITY 
A view of security as relating to self-discipline becomes ingrained in our thinking when 
we are subjected to the constant possibility of surveillance. As noted above, Foucault explains 
that the mechanisms of discipline become automatic. Concerning the police he writes, “In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ‘police’ signified a program of governmental rationality. 
This can be characterized as a project to create a system of regulation of the general conduct of 
individuals whereby everything would be controlled to the point of self-sustenance, without the 
need for intervention.”43 In other words, the mechanism of surveillance pervades society in such 
a way that individuals keep themselves from acting in the ways that would draw attention to 
themselves. The logic takes on almost a life of its own. Citizens must be protected, which means 
they must be monitored, but if I am being monitored, then I must behave. Deviation from norms 
of behavior consequently becomes a cause for concern. 
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The U.S. government acted in direct accordance with this when it set up specific systems 
after 9/11 that were designed to turn citizens into monitors. Mere days after 9/11, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft made a speech before Congress asking for an expansion of presidential 
power. He included in his speech that the government had set up a website and a tip line for 
individuals to call if they encountered anything suspicious in their day-to-day life. The two had 
received a combined 95,000 tips by the time of his speech, a mere 13 days after 9/11.44 
“Terrorists can run,” opined Ashcroft, “but they should have no place to hide.”45 Even now, 
almost fifteen years after the attacks, the motto, “see something, say something,” is still 
pervasive. Shortly after the December 2, 2015, mass shooting that occurred in San Bernardino, 
California,46 several media outlets reported that the neighbors had suspected Syed Farook of 
some sort of criminal activity but refused to report him for fear of being accused of racially or 
ethnically profiling him.47 The clear implication of these stories was that it was the responsibility 
of these citizens to be enforcers. The prevention of terrorist activity is constructed as a 
responsibility of all. Each individual must become the monitor at the center of his or her own 
panopticon. The centers of surveillance, of disciplinary power, are multiple and dispersed, and 
all are implicated in them.48 
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THE LIMITS OF OUR IMAGINATION 
When Jameson articulated his “utopia as method,” he stated that he was trying to 
“reviv[e] long-dormant parts of the mind” so that we could “posi[t] … alternate futures.”49  His 
aim, much like Foucault’s, was to clear out space where we could imagine the present as 
alterable. The security state seeks the opposite. The world of constant monitoring is the utopia 
we need. It might not be perfectly peaceful, but it is (at least in theory) perfectly safe. We must 
surrender our right not to be surveilled or have the “freedom” of a vigilant safety forced upon us. 
When we are watched and when we are watchers, then we have reached utopia. The apparent 
necessity of mechanisms of security staticizes the world before us. Things must stay as they are. 
The security state is both based on this rationality and plays a role in reproducing and dispersing 
its effects. To function it requires citizens who think that safety is paramount and that only 
surveillance can achieve it. If our utopic dreams are, as Jameson contended, designed to 
“disclose the limits of our own imagination of the future,” then our imagination apparently stops 
at the NSA and the FBI. When pressed, the director of the NSA could confirm only that “at most, 
one plot — which he has not specified — might have been disrupted by the bulk phone records 
program alone,” according to a 2013 Guardian report.50 Yet much of the country continues to 
believe that increased security measures are necessary even though such measures have proven 
themselves neither effective nor necessary. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the muslim god. bye” (all errors in the original email). Andrew Taylor, “Illegal,” April 27, 2011. While on one hand 
this could potentially be seen as a form of resistance, whereby he was attempting to waste the time and energy of 
government workers (who allegedly cannot see the content of such communications), it could also be seen as the 
further shaping of subjects whose behavior is altered in correspondence with specific regulations. The once-
exceptional surveillance tactics become a norm that regulates behavior. 
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Works such as Nolan’s Dark Knight Trilogy are central to the production of this nexus 
between utopia and security. Batman is effectively a utopian impulse in the midst of a dystopic 
world. As Gotham crumbles, he rises to save it. Eventually peace comes to Gotham, so Batman 
can retire. The same imagination that generates superhero as savior and sovereign erects a 
worldwide panopticon. It allows spy drones to be used within the United States (albeit 
sparingly)51 and government offices to use secret means to track individuals’ movements via 
their cell phones.52 It is an impulse to a particular form of utopia that is truly dys(u)topic. While 
some may find the security state liberating, others may find the extended surveillance oppressive. 
This is especially true when the same tactics are employed to shut down protests53 or to monitor 
specific groups on the basis of their identity (as at least one GOP presidential candidate has 
recently proposed).54 
But where there is power, there is also resistance. The Dark Knight Trilogy and similar 
dys(u)topian productions do not present uncontestable solutions to potentially dystopic problems. 
Because the dystopia functions primarily as an analytic devise, it can be criticized on the grounds 
of inaccuracy. Batman’s tactics are close to those in the real world — he acts outside of what is 
strictly legal in order to uphold certain aspects of the law, and he employs mass surveillance to 
defeat terrorism — yet the situations he is confronting go far beyond anything that we have ever 
actually been made to encounter. The Joker, Bane, and Ra’s al Ghul all presented far more 
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serious threats to Gotham even than the tragic events of 9/11. The total annihilation of the people 
of Gotham was the risk that had to be prevented. 
The distance between Gotham and the United States ought to give pause to those who 
seek to justify expanded surveillance tactics on the grounds of security. If it takes the crisis of the 
Joker to make Batman’s exploitation of every cell phone in the city seem even remotely 
reasonable, then what situations in our world could even possibly do the same for the far broader 
mechanisms employed by the government? Are terrorist groups as radical as the League of 
Shadows? More importantly, the League of Shadows seems to have no justification for their 
actions other than an effort to bring about justice. Terrorists often have justifications. Some of 
them are certainly difficult to address, especially those that draw primarily on religious factors, 
but it would seem to be a worthwhile task to seek to determine what the causes of terrorism are 
and to alleviate those rather than only to attempt to prevent attacks from happening. 
These suggestions and places for further investigation arise because we view the dystopic 
as analytic. In this sense the dystopic seems as essential to our thinking as Jameson contends the 
utopic is. Utopic visions paint a world at the edges of what we conceive as possible; dystopic 
analytics allow us to see what could be otherwise in the ostensibly utopic solutions we pose 
because they expose the contestability of how we have constructed the problems of dystopia. 
Disciplinary power’s attempts at success rely on closing off the contestability of the techniques 
they employ; dystopian imaginings are essential to rebuffing this closure.  
▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ 
 
What we allow is inseparable from what we believe to be possible. If we believe the only 
possibility for preventing terrorism is to implement more and more invasive mechanisms, then 
that is what we will do. However, if we believe that we can stop terrorism through careful 
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involvement with residents of other countries around the world, then we will take steps to try to 
alleviate the conditions that produce terrorism rather than merely playing catch up after the 
process of creating terrorists has already occurred. It matters what we think of as utopic because 
this will orient us to the options that we will pursue. Likewise, it matters what we think of as 
dystopic because this can highlight where our fears may be exaggerated or misplaced. If 
Jameson’s desire is to clear out space where utopian thinking can occur, then his best ally is the 
dystopic because it confronts the world that is and shows the dangers in it. Dystopia highlights 
potential sites of resistance to the functioning of power. It is up to us to act on them.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
I would to conclude this project by briefly discussing both what I think this paper has 
accomplished and what I believe the next steps of study that need to be taken are. 
First, it has been reestablished (if it was ever in question) that there is a close-knit 
relationship between art and reality. While not a novel point, it is essential, I think, to keep this 
perspective at the forefront of all literary and political analysis. How are we to understand art 
outside of its political role? How can we comprehend politics unless we take cultural productions 
into consideration? I also think that casting the dystopic as analytic instead of as primarily 
normative provides a better basis for examining works classified as dystopic. 
With regard to what areas of study ought to be pursued in tandem with or as a result of 
this study, I contend first and foremost that a genealogy of security needs to be undertaken. To 
do so was well beyond the scope of this project, but in order to begin to understand how we 
might rethink security, we need to understand how it has previously been thought within the 
United States as well as how it is being and has been thought in countries around the world. This 
is obviously a broad scope of analysis, but I think it is essential. 
Second, there needs to be further analysis of the relationship of U.S. foreign policy to 
issues of security. It has been argued by some that continued U.S. involvement within the Middle 
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East generates terrorists.1 If true, then we must rethink our foreign policy strategy as a nation so 
that we are not doing more harm than good. It may also be worthwhile to explore what link (if 
any) exists between poverty and terrorism. This might include a new examination of the way that 
aid is provided to foreign countries. Central to these points is the need to recognize our shared 
precariousness with those whom we construct as other in order to try to explore in what ways 
their sense of precariousness might be reduced. 
Third, we need to be critical and careful in how we review our media and how we let art 
productions affect us. If, as I have argued here, there is a direct and obvious link (and more than 
a link, a shared rationality) between art and politics, then to be an uncritical consumer of art is to 
ignore the role it plays in defining the world that we inhabit. These are the primary suggestions I 
would have for further study in this vein. 
Integrating an understanding of both the impulse to utopian imagining and the 
functioning of dystopic analysis will benefit these studies by allowing us to be aware of the 
limits of our imaginative capacities regarding how the world could be constructed as well as the 
contestability of how we present our world’s problems. Without such an understanding, we may 
be consigned to imagine futures not far different from the dys(u)topic world we already inhabit. 
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